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INTRODUCTION

In this nation of immigrants, few matters of public policy
arouse more intense or divisive public debate than the subject of
change in our immigration and naturalization laws. Presently, our
system of immigration laws, which is grounded upon antiquated
procedure,1 is being tested by new problems. For example, the increase in political asylum cases and the influx of aliens from the
third world have posed new challenges for these outdated procedures. 2 The 97th Congress considered adopting the Simpson-Mazzoli bill in 1982 to alleviate the problems.3
The Senate passed the Simpson-Mazzoli bill on August 17,
1982, but the House did not act on the bill before the close of the
second session. 5 Had Congress enacted the Simpson-Mazzoli bill,
the legislation would have instituted a new system for determining the legality of an alien's presence in the United States and for
nondiscriminatory verification of employment eligibility." Because
the bill placed responsibility for these functions on the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) and other agencies within
the executive branch, government officials would be charged with
1. See Helbrush, INS Violations of its Own Regulations: Relief for the
Alien, 12 GOLDEN GATE U.L. REV. 217, 225 (1982).
2. For a discussion of some of the difficulties facing the Immigration and
Naturalization Service (INS) in its efforts to enforce the statute, see Galvez v.
Howerton, 503 F. Supp. 35, 39 (C.D. Cal. 1980).
3. The bill was originally introduced by Senator Simpson and Representative
Mazzoli on March 17, 1982, as S. 2222, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982), and the
House counterpart as H.R. 5872, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982). The House version
was later renumbered H.R. 6514 after being reported out by the House Subcommittee on Immigration, Refugees, and International Law.
4. S. 2222, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., 128 CONG. REc. 10,609-19 (daily ed. Aug. 17,
1982).
5. 2 CONG. INDEX (CCH) 34,527 (Jan. 20, 1983).
6. See Simpson, Foreword, 20 SAN DIEGo L. REV. 1, 3-4 (1982).
7. H.R. 5872, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. §§ 101-122, reprinted in Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1982: Joint Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Immigration,Refugees, and InternationalLaw of the House Comm. on the Judiciary
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deciding when an alien was privileged to secure employment or to
apply for United States citizenship. Errors by those government
officials could have devastating consequences for aliens.
Aliens injured by these errors could sue the government officials for redress. Also, aliens benefitted by justified reliance on an
official's error could sue to prevent correction of the error. In both
instances the theory of equitable estoppel would be a logical basis
for recovery. 8 Although courts readily may determine the applicability of estoppel in a suit between private parties, the law of estoppel against the government is unsettled. This Recent Development will analyze the use of equitable estoppel against the
government in immigration suits, emphasizing the Supreme
Court's most recent decision in that area, 9 Immigration and NaturalizationService v. Miranda, 103 S. Ct. 281 (1982).
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Many courts have wrestled with the issues of whether and to
what extent the government may be estopped.1 0 Unfortunately,
the Supreme Court's treatment of the subject has been

haphazard."
and the Subcomm. on Immigration and Refugee Policy of the Senate Comm. on

the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 6-25, 51 (1982).
8. "Equitable estoppel is a judicial remedy by which a party to a legal controversy is precluded, because of some improper action on his part, from asserting a claim or defense, regardless of its objective validity." Note, Equitable Estoppel of the Government, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 551, 552 (1979). For an excellent
discussion of when estoppel might be used against the federal government, see
Newman, Should Official Advice Be Reliable?-Proposalsas to Estoppel and
Related Doctrines in Administrative Law, 53 COLUM. L. REV. 374 (1953). See
also Santiago v. INS, 526 F.2d 488, 493-96 (9th Cir. 1975) (Choy, J., dissenting),
cert. denied, 425 U.S. 971 (1976); Comment, Never Trust a Bureaucrat:Estoppel Against the Government, 42 S. CAL. L. REV. 391, 391 (1969) (pressing the
case for allowing estoppel to be invoked more easily against the government).
9. It is beyond the scope of this Recent Development to treat the full development of this doctrine in the lower courts. For a good discussion of the more
important federal court cases, see Note, supra note 8, at 552-58.
10. See Comment, supra note 8, at 391. For a discussion of case law addressing the issue of estoppel in immigration and naturalization matters, see Asimow,
Estoppel Against the Government: The Immigration and NaturalizationService, 2 CHICANo L. REV. 4, 24 (1975).
11. See, e.g., Gordon, Finality of Immigration and Nationality Determinations-Can the Government Be Estopped?, 31 U. CH. L. REV. 433 (1964); Note,
Estopping the Government in Immigration Cases: The Immigration Estoppel
Light Remains Cautionary Yellow, 56 NOTRE DAmE LAw. 731 (1981).
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The Traditional Rule-No Estoppel Against the
Government
1.

The Rationale

From the beginning of the Republic, the Supreme Court refused to apply estoppel against the government. 12 The Court
feared that using estoppel against the government would result in
(1) inappropriate interference with governmental functions, (2)
collusion between government officials and private parties, (3)
stagnant governmental policy, and (4) legislative activity by governmental agencies.13 The Court was most concerned with the potential for draining the public treasury 14' and for compromising
the separation of powers in the national government. 5 The latter
concern would arise, for example, if an agency of the executive
branch mistakenly granted an alien a benefit contrary to the express legislative intent of Congress, and the judicial branch then
estopped that agency from correcting the error.1 6
2.

The Early Cases

The Court drew upon the doctrine of sovereign immunity in its
first decisions concerning estoppel of the government.17 As use of
the sovereign immunity doctrine waned, 8 the Court applied the
principles of agency law19 to deny estoppel on the ground that
government officials act outside the bounds of their authority
when they make mistakes.20 The two most significant cases in this
12. For an excellent discussion of the early Supreme Court treatment of equitable estoppel against the government, see Asimow, supra note 10, at 5-10. See

also Note, supra note 8, at 552-55.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

Comment, supra note 8, at 406.
See infra text accompanying notes 44, 151-52, & 157.
Note, supra note 8, at 565.
See id.
See generally Asimow, supra note 10, at 7-10.
See Note, supra note 8, at 554.
See Asimow, supra note 10, at 5-10.
As one commentator notes: "[Ilt is axiomatic that a government official

has no authority to give unlawful or incorrect advice, make misrepresentations,

or other misconduct." Comment, Estoppel and Government, 14 GONZ. L. REv.
597, 606 (1979). See also Asimow, supra note 10, at 11 (government contract
cases have not conferred authority to make errors concerning statutes or regulations); Parcel, Making the Government Fight Fairly: Estopping the United
States, 27 ROCKY MTN. MiN. L. INST. 41, 54 (1982).
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area are Lee v. Munroe21 and Utah Power & Light Co. v. United
States.22
a. The government is not bound by actions of its agents
outside the scope of their authority
The plaintiff in Lee v. Munroe, an 1813 case, sued the Public
Commissioners of Washington, D.C., seeking to deduct a sum
equal to a debt owed him by a third party from a lien judgment
he owed the United States. The plaintiff lent money to that third
party in reliance upon misinformation given him by the Public
Commissioners.23 Because the defendants gratuitously gave the
information to the plaintiff, 4 and because the communication
was outside the scope of the Commissioners' official duties, the
Court would not allow the United States to suffer from the error.25 Because a government lien on land was at issue, the Su-

preme Court found that the use of estoppel might establish a
dangerous precedent whereby valuable tracts of public lands
could be alienated without the payment of debts owed to the
public treasury. 2 Moreover, the Court was concerned about the
possibility of collusion inherent in a rule that allows an alleged
mistake to be the grounds for recovery against the government.27
Thus, in Lee v. Munroe the Supreme Court initiated the rule that
flatly denies the use of government estoppel.2

11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 366 (1813).
22. 243 U.S. 389 (1917).
21.

23.

11 U.S. at 366.

24. Id. at 369.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Language in the syllabus to the Court's opinion suggests that estoppel

may be applied against the government. Id. at 366 ("the United States are not
bound by the declaration of their agent, founded upon a mistake of fact, unless
it clearly appear[s] that the agent was acting within the scope of his authority,
and was empowered, in his capacity of agent, to make such declaration"). Syllabi, however, are not part of the opinion, and thus the language has no legal
effect.
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b. The government may not be estopped by actions that the
law does not sanction or permit
More than a century after deciding Lee v. Munroe, the Supreme Court decided Utah Power & Light.2 9 The defendants in
that case operated electrical power generating facilities in Utah
on land adjacent to federal forest reservations. Defendants contended that their predecessors and agents or officers of the
United States government came to an understanding when the
reservations were created that the presence of the reservations
would not inhibit the construction and operation of the generating facilities. 30 The government later sued to enjoin defendants'
occupancy and use of the federal lands on the grounds that the
defendants had not secured the statutorily required grant or license to use the land.3 1 Defendants countered that the government should be estopped from asserting this complaint because of
the agreement made by the government's agents and because the
government had failed to object to the usage.32 The Court dismissed the estoppel argument with a single sentence: "Of this it is
enough to say that the United States is neither bound nor estopped by acts of its officers or agents in entering into an arrangement or agreement to do or cause to be done what the law does
not sanction or permit."33 The Court also rejected defendants' argument that the failure of government agents to object to defendants' use of the land could give rise to estoppel. According to the
Court, the government is entitled to enforce a public right or protect a public interest, regardless of actions taken by government
29. 243 U.S. 389 (1917).
30. Id. at 408.
31. Id. at 405-09.
32. 243 U.S. at 396. The power company also asserted that estoppel was appropriate because the government's interest in the land was proprietary. Id.
Counsel for the United States in Utah Power argued that the government

"may be deprived of rights or interests in land under the principles of equitable
estoppel." Id. In support of its proposition, counsel cited the following cases:

Broder v. Water Co., 101 U.S. 274 (1879); Jennison v. Kirk, 98 U.S. 453 (1878).
Utah Power & Light, 243 U.S. at 396. Counsel for plaintiff also advanced authority for the proposition that the government "is with respect to its property

or proprietary interests subject to the principles of equitable estoppel in the
same manner and under the same circumstances as a private individual or corporation." Id.

33. 243 U.S. at 408-09.
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agents. 4
35
3. Federal Crop Insurance Corp. v. Merrill

The Federal Crop Insurance Corporation," created to insure
wheat farmers against unavoidable loss in yields, 37 published certain regulations in the Federal Register on February 7, 1945.8
Those regulations made certain classes of wheat ineligible for insurance coverage.3 9 Respondent Merrill applied for crop insurance
on March 26, 1945. He was informed that his entire crop was insurable when, in fact, 400 of his 460 acres were ineligble for coverage under the new regulations. The Federal Crop Insurance Corporation mistakenly accepted Merrill's application for insurance
on May 28, 1945, almost two months after the new regulations
were promulgated and published. In July 1945, Merrill's crop was
largely destroyed by drought. Upon notification of the loss, the
Corporation discovered the mistake and refused to compensate
Merrill for the loss. 40 Merrill took the issue before a jury and won.
The Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the verdict. 41 On appeal to
the United States Supreme Court the case was reversed.4 2
The Supreme Court affirmed the scope of authority rule found
in Lee v. Munroe and Utah Power & Light,43 reiterating the concern that estoppel would imperil the public fisc. 4' The Court also
expressly rejected any distinction, for purposes of estoppel, between the sovereign and proprietary activities of the federal government.45 Justice Jackson filed a vigorous dissent in the split decision, 46 attacking the presumption that all citizens know the
34. Id. at 409.
35. 332 U.S. 380 (1947).
36. Federal Crop Insurance Act, ch. 70, 52 Stat. 72 (1938) (codified as
amended at 7 U.S.C. §§ 1501-1520 (1982)).
37. 332 U.S. at 381-82.
38. 10 Fed. Reg. 1586.
39. Id.
40. 332 U.S. at 382.
41. 67 Idaho 196, 174 P.2d 834 (1946).
42. 332 U.S. at 386.
43. See id. at 384.
44. See id. at 385.
45. See id. at 383-84. Nevertheless, the distinction has been used by many
courts when analyzing Selective Service and tax cases. Asimow, supra note 10, at
16-23.
46. See, e.g., 4 K. DAviS, ADMINISTRATVE LAW TREATISE § 20:3, at 7 (2d ed.
1983) ("Something is wrong when the citizen can recover for a dented fender
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substance of federal regulations.
Both the view that there is no difference between sovereign and
proprietary governmental activities and the view that estoppel
threatens the public fisc have been strongly criticized, 7 rendering
the precedential value of the case doubtful.48 Critics have called
for a reconsideration of the principles underlying the government
estoppel rules. 49 One court complained that it was "without the

power to invoke principles of equity" in actions against the government.5 0 Professor Davis articulated the courts' dilemma: "Our
main function is to do justice, but we don't have any authority to
be fair." 51 This increasing judicial pressure from the lower courts
stemmed largely from the harshness of the result in Merrill and
threatened to shatter the Supreme Court's insistence on governmental immunity from the application of equitable estoppel. Nevertheless, Merrill is the Supreme Court decision cited most often
52
for the proposition that the government may not be estopped.

caused by a postal employee at the wheel of a government truck and one cannot
when he is booby-trapped by an employee of Federal Crop Insurance") (quoting
McFarlin v. Federal Crop Ins. Corp., 438 F.2d 1237 (9th Cir. 1971)); Comment,
supra note 8, at 394 (citing Spanel v. Mounds View School Dist., 264 Minn. 279,
118 N.W.2d 795 (1962)).
47. "[T]he Supreme Court stated no reason for the decision [in Merrill],
other than that 'It is too late in the day to urge that the Government is just
another private litigant,' and other than that 'Men must turn square corners
when they deal with the Government."' 4 K. DAVIS, supra note 46, § 20:3, at 7.
48. Comment, supra note 20, at 601. "The lower courts commonly regard the
Merrill case as wrong, even though it is authoritative." 4 K. DAvIs, supra note
46, § 20:3, at 7. Because "the idea is an appealing one that estoppel law should
apply to the government when it engages in a business of the kind that is ordinarily conducted by private corporations," and because the Court completely
rejected that position, Merrill is "an especially strong authority against estopping the government." Id., § 20:3, at 6 (emphasis in original).
49. "Criticism of the traditional approaches to estoppel against the government has been voluminous." Case Comment, Emergence of An EquitableDoctrine of Estoppel Against the Government-The Oil Shale Cases, 46 U. CoLo.
L. REv. 433, 445 (1975). See also Asimow, supra note 10, at 37-39; Case Comment, supra, at 445 n.62; Note, supra note 8, at 559.
50.

Kalter v. United States, 130 F. Supp. 79, 82 (E.D.N.Y. 1955).

51.

Kenneth C. Davis, who is the John P. Wilson Professor Emeritus at the

University of Chicago, is the author of K. DAvis,

ADmINSTRATIVE LAW TREATISE

(2d ed. 1983).

52. K. DAviS,

ADMINISTRATIWE LAW

§ 17.04 (1st ed. 1959).
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B. Moser v. United States-The Government Is "Estopped"
The strict rule against government estoppel began to erode 53 in
1950. In Podea v. Acheson,54 the Second Circuit held that misinformation obtained from government agents, which caused the
plaintiff to lose his nationality, negated the state of mind necessary for expatriation. 5 Although the court did not expressly hold
the government estopped, the result conforms with an estoppel
analysis. After a century of Supreme Court decisions espousing
the strong rule against estoppel, Podea was "a rather surprising
departure." 5 One year later an even more startling development
occurred.
In 1951 the Supreme Court decided Moser v. United States, 57
which presented an unusual claim for estoppel. In 1938 Paul
Moser, a Swiss national residing in the United States, filed a declaration of intent to become a United States citizen. In 1940 he
registered under the Selective Service Act and, as a dependent,
was classified III-A.58 At that time, the Treaty of 185059 between
the United States and Switzerland provided an exemption from
military duty for nationals of one country residing in the other.60
Accordingly, the United States Selective Service and Training
Act6 1 gave foreign nationals the right to claim exemption from
service in the United States military, but the Act disqualified
those claiming the exemption from later becoming United States
citizens. The Swiss Government objected to the statute because it
believed that the statute was inconsistent with the treaty. To
mollify the Swiss, the United States Department of State altered
53. The development of estoppel against the government in the Selective
Servic6 and tax cases is not treated here. See supra note 45. The Supreme Court
has not addressed the issue in such cases.
54. 179 F.2d 306 (2d Cir. 1950).
55. Id. at 309. Cf. United States v. Fox Lake State Bank, 366 F.2d 962, 965
(7th Cir. 1966) (analogous case involving the Federal False Claims Act).
56. Asimow, supra note 10, at 26.
57. 341 U.S. 41 (1951).
58. Id. at 42.
59. Convention with the Swiss Confederation, Nov. 25, 1850, United StatesSwitzerland, 11 Stat. 587, T.S. No. 353.
60. Article II of the treaty provides that: "The citizens of one of the two
countries, residing or established in the other, shall be free from personal military service.. . ." Id., art. II, 11 Stat. 587, 589.
61. Selective Training and Service Act of 1940, ch. 720, 54 Stat. 885 (1940),
amended by Act of Dec. 19, 1941, ch. 598, 55 Stat. 844.
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the military service exemption form. On the new form the State
Department deleted the express notice that the applicant was disqualifying himself from citizenship 2 and instead set out the text
of the governing statute in a footnote.
In January 1944, Moser was reclassified I-A, "available for service.'' He subsequently contacted the Swiss Legation for assistance in securing a deferment pursuant to the treaty. The Legation sent him the revised forms and a letter incorrectly asking
him to "[p]lease note that, through filing of DSS Form 301, revised, you will not waive your right to apply for American citizenship papers. The final decision regarding your naturalization will
remain solely with the competent Naturalization Courts."6 Moser
relied upon this statement, signed the revised DSS form in February 1944, and was reclassified IV-C.6 5 In July 1949, he was admitted to citizenship by a United States district court, 6 but because of his military exemption the Second Circuit reversed his
67
admission.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari 8 and reversed the court
of appeals, 69 holding that "elementary fairness" required nothing
less than an intelligent waiver of Moser's rights to citizenship. Because of the "misleading circumstances" of the case, Moser did
not have the opportunity "to make an intelligent election between
the diametrically opposed courses required as a matter of strict
law."' 70 The Court thus implicitly adopted the Podea holding and
incorporated it into the waiver theory upon which it grounded its
holding.7 1 Although this result appears to estop the government, 2

62. "Above the signature line on this form there appeared the statement, in
obvious reference to the proviso of § 3(a): 'I understand that the making of this
application to be relieved from such liability will debar me from becoming a

citizen of the United States."' 341 U.S. at 44.
63. Id. at 42.
64. Id. at 44.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

Id. at 45.
In re Petition of Moser, 85 F. Supp. 683 (E.D.N.Y. 1949).
182 F.2d 734 (2d Cir. 1950).
340 U.S. 910 (1951).
341 U.S. at 47.

70. Id.
71. See Note, supra note 11, at 732; see also supra text accompanying notes
51-56.

72. See R.H. Stearns Co. v. United States, 291 U.S. 54, 61-62 (1934) (Cardozo, J.); Comment, supra note 20, at 603; Note, Equitable Estoppel: Does Governmental Immunity Mean Never Having to Say You're Sorry?, 56 ST. JOHN'S
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Justice Minton denied that this decision either estopped the
United States Government or recognized the ability of the Swiss
73
Legation to bind the United States Government.
The Moser decision is surprising for three reasons. First, it is a
radical departure from Federal Crop Insurance Corp. v. Merrill,
which was decided only four years earlier. The Court in Merrill
refused relief when the government acted in a proprietary capacity, but the Court in Moser applied an estoppel-like remedy when
the government acted in a sovereign capacity. 74 Second, Moser's

claim for binding the government was based upon weak facts.
Moser signed a form which explicitly stated the statutory provision that denied Moser the privilege of United States citizenship.7 5 Furthermore, Moser relied on the advice of Swiss officials.
He never pursued the issue with the United States Government.7 6
Nevertheless, the Court unanimously held that he had not lost his
nationality by expatriation. 7 Finally, despite Justice Minton's
statement that it was unnecessary to determine the binding effect
of the Swiss Legation's advice to Moser, it appears that the
Court's waiver theory could result only from that advice. 78
After Moser the federal courts began to give relief in immigration cases without using the terms "estoppel" or "apparent authority. '7 91 Although Moser is not a clear case of estoppel against

the government, the Court's reasoning in Moser is useful in analyzing government estoppel problems in other areas.80 It is surprising, therefore, that for the next fifteen years the case rarely
was relied upon outside the immigration field.'
L. REv.114, 122 n.44 (1981).
73. 341 U.S. at 47.
74. 4 K. DAviS, supra note 46, § 20:1, at 2.
75. Asimow, supra note 10, at 25.
76. Id.
77. 341 U.S. 41, 47 (1950).
78. It is not unreasonable to wonder whether "[t]he Swiss Legation by writing a letter to a Swiss citizen changed the effect of a statute enacted by Congress." 4 K. DAvis, supra note 46, § 20:4, at 8.
79. Asimow, supra note 10, at 26-27. See Hetzer v. INS, 420 F.2d 357 (9th
Cir. 1970); Tejeda v. INS, 346 F.2d 389 (9th Cir. 1965); McLeod v. Peterson, 283
F.2d 180 (3d Cir. 1960).
80.

4 K. DAvis, supra note 46, § 20:4, at 9.

81. See Asimow, supra note 10, at 25. Nevertheless, in 1973 the Ninth Circuit relied on Moser when it expressly held the government estopped in a
nonimmigration case. See United States v. Lazy FC Ranch, 481 F.2d 985 (9th
Cir. 1973).
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Estoppel in Immigration Cases and the Debut of
"Affirmative Misconduct"

Because most immigration cases concern the rights of a single
alien and do not blatantly threaten the public fisc, it is understandable that in immigration cases the federal courts are more
2
willing to grant estoppel-like remedies against the government.
Even after Moser, however, the Supreme Court, apparently concerned about the erosion of its rule against estoppel, refused to
estop the government in two major immigration cases.
1. Montana v. Kennedy"3
The plaintiff, Mauro John Montana, was born in Italy in 1906
while his mother, Maddelena, a native United-States citizen, and
his father, Giuseppe, an Italian national, were residing there temporarily. Later that year, his mother brought him to the United
States, where he resided continuously until the time of suit.
Prior to Montana's birth, Maddelena attempted to leave Italy
for the United States, but a United States Consular Officer told
her, "I am sorry, Mrs., you cannot go in that condition. . .. You
come back after you get your baby.' 4 Many years later Montana
sued for a declaration of United States citizenship. He rested his
claim upon grounds of estoppel and certain statutory provisions,
arguing that the Consular Officer essentially refused to issue his
mother a passport. That refusal prevented his birth on United
States soil and thereby precluded him from inheriting his
mother's citizenship. Both the district court and the court of appeals denied him citizenship.8 5 The Supreme Court granted certiorari86 "in view of the apparent harshness of the result, 8 7 but
upheld the decision of the lower courts.88 The Court disposed of
the estoppel claim by finding that Maddelena's reliance on the
Consular Officer's statement was unreasonable or that she was
not prevented in fact from returning to the United States. Surprisingly, Justice Harlan addressed the estoppel question by stat82. See Note, supra note 11, at 737 n.61 (citing In re LaVoie, 349 F. Supp.
68, 74 (D.V.I. 1972)).
83. 366 U.S. 308 (1961).

84. Montana v. Rogers, 278 F.2d 68, 70 (1960).
85. Id. at 68-69 (syllabus).
86. 364 U.S. 861.
87. 366 U.S. at 309 (1961).
88. Id. at 308.
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ing: "In this situation, we need not stop to inquire whether, as
some lower courts have held, there may be circumstances in
which the United States is estopped to deny citizenship because
' This language prompted the
of the conduct of its officials."89
comment that Montana v. Kennedy is "hard to interpret."9' 0 The
Court did not estop the government, but declined to comment
upon the lower court cases that had permitted government estoppel.91 A dozen years later, the Court reexamined Montana to establish "affirmative misconduct"9 2 as an elusive standard for government estoppel analysis.
2. Immigration and NaturalizationService v. Hibi 3
Hibi was a Philippino who enlisted and served throughout the
Second World War in the Philippine Scouts, a unit of the United
States Army.9 4 While on active duty with the Scouts, Hibi and
other members of the Philippine Scouts were eligible for naturalization under sections 701 and 702 of the Nationality Act of
1940."5 After the Philippines were liberated in 1945, Philippine
government officials expressed concern that many of the Philippine soldiers eligible for naturalization would go to the United
States.96 In response, the United States Government withdrew
nationalization authority from its consul in the Philippines, only
to return the authority and nationalize a number of Philippine
97
Scouts after Hibi had left the service.

In April 1964 Hibi first entered the United States. Although
the period for claiming naturalization pursuant to the Nationality
Act had expired seventeen years earlier,98 Hibi petitioned for nat89. Id. at 315 (citing Lee You Fee v. Dulles, 236 F.2d 885, 887 (7th Cir.
1956); Podea v. Acheson, 179 F.2d 306 (2d Cir. 1950)).

90. 4 K. DAvis, supra note 46, § 20:2, at 4.
91. See Note, supra note 72, at 123 n.48.

92. The development of the affirmative misconduct "standard" is ably
treated in Akbarin v. INS, 669 F.2d 839, 843 (1st Cir. 1982). An attempt to describe affirmative misconduct can be found in Note, supra note 8, at 559-60.
93. 414 U.S. 5 (1973) (per curiam).
94. Hibi was captured by the Japanese and interned for six months. Id. at 5.

95. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1002, 1005 (Supp. V 1940) (current version at 8 U.S.C. §

1440 (1982)), repealed by Act of June 27, 1952, ch. 477, § 403(a)(42), 66 Stat.

280.
96. See Asimow, supra note 10, at 30.

97. Id. at 31.
98. 414 U.S. at 7. By amendment it was required that all petitions under §
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uralization. Hibi argued that the government should be estopped
from relying on the expired time limit to deny naturalization because the government did not advise him of his rights or provide
a naturalization representative in the Philippines. The lack of advice prevented him from meeting the requirements of the Nationality Act.99 Both the district court and the court of appeals agreed
with Hibi. 100 The Supreme Court, however, in a per curiam opinion with three justices dissenting,10 1 granted certiorari and
2
10

reversed.

The majority rejected the distinction between the sovereign
and proprietary functions of government. 03 In the most important passage of the opinion, however, the Court reads Montana as
leaving open the possibility of estoppel against the government
when "affirmative misconduct" by government agents is shown.' 4
The Court refused to use estoppel in Hibi because the inaction
10 5
complained of did not constitute affirmative misconduct.
Justice Douglas' dissent criticized the majority's summary disposition of the estoppel issue.106 His characterization of the majority's reasoning suggests that affirmative misconduct is a threshold requirement for any estoppel of the government. 107 Although
Douglas apparently admitted that inaction constituting affirmative misconduct may be excused,108 he rejected the majority's im701 be filed no later than December 31, 1946. Act of December 28, 1945, ch. 390,
§ 1(c)(i), 59 Stat. 658.
99. 414 U.S. at 7-8.
100. Id. at 8. The court of appeals opinion is reported at 475 F.2d 7 (9th Cir.
1973).
101. Justices Douglas, Brennan, and Marshall dissented.
102. 414 U.S. at 9.
103. Id. at 8.
104. Id. The Court stated that "the issue of whether 'affirmative misconduct'
on the part of Government might estop it from denying citizenship was left open
in Montana v. Kennedy. . .

."

Id. The words "affirmative misconduct" appear

nowhere in the Montana opinion.
105. See Note, supra note 72, at 124.
106. 414 U.S. at 9-11 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
107. See id. at 9.
108. See id. at 9-11. The same commentator who read the Court's rationale
in Hibi as "inaction is not affirmative," see infra text accompanying note 111,
characterized that reasoning as "erroneous": "Estoppel can certainly arise from
silence or other conscious inaction, where there is a duty to speak or act, when
that silence or inaction prompts detrimental reliance. Although there may be a
distinction between action and inaction in other contexts, it matters little in
estoppel cases." Asimow, supra note 10, at 31-32.
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plicit position that inaction of government agents cannot be affirmative misconduct. 10 9 Finally, Douglas argued that the absence
of the naturalization officer constituted affirmative misconduct
because the absence resulted from the direct and intended act of
the United States Attorney General, upon advice of the Commissioner of Immigration.'1 0
Courts and commentators have differed over the importance of
the Hibi opinion. 1 Many have noted that the facts of Hibi do
not present a strong claim for invoking estoppel 1 2 and that the
13
majority's summary discussion limits its precedential value.
Significantly, the Supreme Court did not define affirmative misconduct 1 4 or provide the lower courts with guidelines for deter-

mining its presence. 1 5 Because the Hibi Court did not explicitly

reject the no-estoppel rule" 6 and because the Court intimated
that it would consider an estoppel claim if plaintiff proved sufficiently egregious government conduct, Hibi was "a modest step"
toward providing relief to victims of governmental error. 117 Except for those cases concerning government inaction, 1 the step
was to prove effective. If Moser suggested that the door to gov-

ernment estoppel could be opened, Hibi provided the key.119
109. 414 U.S. at 9 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
110. Id. at 9-11.
111. See, e.g., Sun II Yoo v. INS, 534 F.2d 1325, 1329 (9th Cir. 1976) (The
Ninth Circuit said a delay in processing immigration papers may be affirmative
misconduct). This has led one commentator to suggest that Hibi "requires the
existence of a duty in order for government action to be considered misconduct." Note, supra note 93, at 134 n.104 (citing Santiago v. INS, 526 F.2d 488,
493 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 971 (1976)).
112. Portmann v. United States, 674 F.2d 1155, 1164 (7th Cir. 1982).
113. See Asimow, supra note 10, at 31; Note, supra note 11, at 736.
114. See Note, supra note 11, at 737. Indeed, the court in Community
Health Services v. Califano, 698 F.2d 615, 620 (3rd Cir. 1983) (quoting
Schweiker v. Hansen, 450 U.S. 785 (1981)), stated that the Supreme Court "has
never decided what type of conduct by a Government employee will estop the
Government from insisting on compliance with valid regulations governing the
distribution of welfare benefits." Id.
115.

See Hing, Estoppel in Immigration Proceedings-New Life from

Akbarin and Miranda, 20 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 11, 14 (1982); Note, supra note 11,
at 738.
116. See Asimow, supra note 10, at 36-37.
117. See Note, supra note 8, at 560.
118. See Asimow, supra note 10, at 36-37.
119. See Note, supra note 11, at 732.
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3. Santiago v. Immigration and NaturalizationService-The
Ninth Circuit's Response to Hibi
Relying on Hibi, lower courts began to define an affirmative
misconduct standard 120 and use estoppel against the federal government. 12 1 The affirmative misconduct standard was particularly
difficult to define. 122 Prior to Hibi, the Ninth Circuit had taken
the lead in developing ways to bind the government without calling it estoppel and had developed the two-part balancing approach. The test, first enunciated in United States v. Lazy FC
Ranch,12 required a court to determine whether all of the traditional requirements for equitable estoppel were present and then
to balance the potential harm to the public interest against the
severity of the injury facing the individual. 1 24 Although the Ninth
120. See id. at 732-33 (citing the following cases: Simon v. Califano, 593 F.2d
121, 123 (9th Cir. 1979); United States v. Ruby Co., 588 F.2d 697, 703-04 (9th
Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 917 (1979); Yang v. INS, 574 F.2d 171, 175 (3d
Cir. 1978) (dictum); Corniel-Rodriguez v. INS, 532 F.2d 301, 306-07 (2d Cir.
1976); Santiago v. INS, 526 F.2d 488, 492-93 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425
U.S. 971 (1976)). See also Note, supra note 72, at 134 n.104.
At least two commentators have taken the position that lower court reliance
upon or use of the Hibi affirmative misconduct language was improper. See
Comment, Santiago v. Immigration and Naturalization Service-The Ninth Circuit Retreats from its Modern Approach to Estoppel Against the Government.
1976 UTAH L. REV. 371, 380-83; Note, supra note 11, at 736-39.
121. See Note, supra note 72, at 125-26. The author of this Note claimed
that, as of 1981, "[a]t least eight circuits have allowed equitable estoppel to be
applied to the federal government." Id. at 126 n.67. She listed the following
cases to support that proposition: Yang v. INS, 574 F.2d 171, 174-75 (3d Cir.
1978); Enfant Plaza Prop., Inc. v. District of Columbia Redev. Land Agency, 564
F.2d 515, 524 (D.C. Cir. 1977); United States v. Lucienne D'Hotelle de Benitez
Rexach, 558 F.2d 37, 43 (1st Cir. 1977); Corniel-Rodriguez v. INS, 532 F.2d 301,
306-07 (2d Cir. 1976); United States v. Wharton, 514 F.2d 406, 409-12 (9th Cir.
1975); C.F. Lytle Co. v. Clark, 491 F.2d 834, 838 (10th Cir. 1974); United States
v. Florida, 482 F.2d 205, 209 (5th Cir. 1973) (dictum); United States v. Fox Lake
State Bank, 366 F.2d 962, 965-66 (7th Cir. 1966). But see United States v. One
1973 Buick Riviera Auto., 560 F.2d 897, 899 (8th Cir. 1977) (per curiam); United
States v. Ulvedal, 372 F.2d 31, 35 (8th Cir. 1967); Note, supra note 72, at 126
n.67.
122. See Note, supra note 72, at 133. The Ninth Circuit even split up the
phrase in Oki v. INS, 598 F.2d 1160, 1162 (9th Cir. 1979), holding that affirmative government conduct was a prerequisite to a finding of misconduct. But see
Sun II Yoo v. INS, 534 F.2d 1325, 1328-29 (9th Cir. 1976).
123. 481 F.2d 985, 989-90 (9th Cir. 1973).
124. Id. at 988-90. See Hing, supra note 115, at 14 n.19; Note, supra note 72,

at 128.
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Circuit maintained that this analysis applied to all government
activities, even those characterized as sovereign, the court admitted its reluctance to estop the government when it acted as sover-

eign. 125 The Hibi decision forced the Ninth Circuit to retreat
somewhat from this progressive development of the estoppel doctrine, 26 and in Santiago v. Immigration and NaturalizationService12 ' the Ninth Circuit first dealt with immigration estoppel af12
ter Hibi. 8

In Santiago four aliens claimed that the government should be
estopped from asserting their excludability at entry into the
United States because they were "unfairly misled into the belief
that [their] entry was lawful." 2 " The Ninth Circuit found that
neither Hibi nor Montana had disturbed Moser 30 and, citing
Hibi, held that affirmative misconduct was necessary for estoppel.""' Finding no affirmative misconduct,13 2 the court affirmed
the Board of Immigration Appeals' determination that the aliens
were excludable at entry.1 33
The Santiago decision is significant because of the method
used by the court to find an absence of affirmative misconduct.
The Santiago court simply weighed the actions complained
of-the failure to inform the aliens about the requirements or inquire about their status-against the actions complained of in
Hibi. Only if the actions were "more blameworthy" than those in
125. United States v. Lazy FC Ranch, 481 F.2d 985, 989 (9th Cir. 1973). See
also Comment, supra note 20, at 604.
126. See Hing, supra note 115, at 14; Note, supra note 11, at 734. Professor
Davis lists the following cases as evidence that the Ninth Circuit is "less liberal
than it once was in estopping the government": TRW, Inc. v. FTC, 647 F.2d 942,
951 (9th Cir. 1981) (more than negligence required to show affirmative misconduct); Simon v. Califano, 593 F.2d 121, 123 (9th Cir. 1979) ("Mere neglect of
duty is not enough"); Saulque v. United States, 663 F.2d 968 (9th Cir. 1981) (a
land developer who relied upon a letter from the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA)
stating that a parcel of land was available was denied estoppel when BIA decided land was not available); 4 K. DAvIs, supra note 46, at 19.
127. 526 F.2d 488 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 971 (1976).
128. Note, supra note 11, at 734. For excellent discussions of the Ninth Circuit's treatment of Santiago, see id. at 734-35; Comment, supra note 120,
passim.
129. 526 F.2d at 491.
130. Id. at 492.
131. See Note, supra note 11, at 734.
132. See 526 F.2d at 492-93.
133. Id. at 493.
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Hibi would the Ninth Circuit find affirmative misconduct and
consider applying estoppel.1 34 The court found the failures in
Santiago to be less blameworthy than those in Hibi. Thus, the
Ninth Circuit determined there was no affirmative misconduct in
Santiago. 35 This analysis has been dubbed the "compare with
Hibi" test or simply the Ninth Circuit comparative test.13 The
13 7
Supreme Court denied certiorari in this case.
Other federal courts accepted the proposition that affirmative
misconduct is a precondition to using estoppel against the government,138 and a number of courts held that unreasonable or excessive delay in processing immigration documents could constitute
affirmative misconduct. 139 By the close of the decade, courts and
commentators agreed that, in the right circumstances, estoppel
should be allowed even when the government conduct took the
form of silence, inaction, or delay. 40 Two recent Supreme Court
cases, however, have rejected that construction and added more
confusion to an already muddled field.
III. THE RECENT CASES
A.

Schweiker v. Hansen

While the Ninth Circuit was refining its comparative test, the
Second Circuit was developing a new analysis for determining
whether government estoppel was appropriate. This test, first
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Hing, supra note 115, at 15.

137. 425 U.S. 971 (1976).
138. See Note, supra note 11, at 736; Recent Development, Schweiker v.
Hansen: Equitable Estoppel Against the Government, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 609,
613 (1982). See id. at 613 n.35 (list of cases). See also Note, supra note 72, at
117 & nn.11-12.
139. See Mendoza-Hernandez v. INS, 664 F.2d 635, 639 (7th Cir. 1981); Villena v. INS, 622 F.2d 1352 (9th Cir. 1980) (en banc); Sun II Yoo v. INS, 534 F.2d
1325, 1328 (9th Cir. 1976); Galvez v. Howerton, 503 F. Supp. 35, 40 (C.D. Cal.
1980). See also Hing, supra note 115, at 19-21, 32. In Sun Il Yoo, a one year
delay in processing a change in status application was held to be affirmative
misconduct. 534 F.2d at 1328. INS officials are under a "duty" to act within a
reasonable time. Id. at 1328-29.
140. See Note, supra note 8, at 560; see also United States v. Hanna Nickel
Smelting Co., 253 F. Supp. 784, 793 (D. Or. 1966), affd on other grounds, 400
F.2d 944 (9th Cir. 1968); United States v. Certain Parcels of Land, 131 F. Supp.
65, 74 (S.D. Cal. 1955); United States v. Brabham, 122 F. Supp. 570, 572
(E.D.S.C. 1954).
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14 1
used in Hansen v. Harris,
examined the nature of the legal re-

quirement misrepresented by the government agent, distinguishing between substantive requirements, for which estoppel was allowed, and procedural requirements, for which it was not
allowed.14 2 In Hansen v. Harris the Second Circuit applied this
new test and estopped the government from denying retroactive
benefits to a social security recipient.
The new approach was criticized as a "departure from traditional notions of affirmative misconduct.

' 143

Judge Friendly dis-

sented. He criticized the majority for not only breaking with authority but also for blurring the distinction between substance
and procedure.14 4 According to Judge Friendly the regulation at
issue in Hansen v. Harris was neither clearly substantive nor
clearly procedural. 45
The government petitioned for certiorari14 and the Supreme
Court reversed the court of appeals.
Although the Court did
not apply the Second Circuit's procedural and substantive distinction, neither did the Court reject the distinction.14 The Court

141. See Hansen v. Harris, 619 F.2d 942, 948 (2d Cir. 1980), rev'd sub nom.
Schweiker v. Hansen, 450 U.S. 785 (1981) (per curiam).
142. Id.
143. Recent Development, supra note 138, at 610. See also Note, supra note
72, at 130-31.
144. Judge Friendly specifically stated:
The majority is simply disregarding the Supreme Court's decisions in Merrill, Montana and Hibi, and placing ourselves in square conflict with the
decisions of most, indeed probably all other courts of appeals in similar
cases-and all of this on an exceedingly weak set of facts and a newly
found jurisprudential distinction which cannot survive analysis. There are
some rules of federal law that had best [be] left unchanged until Congress
decides to alter them even when the result is much harsher than here.
This is one of them.
619 F.2d at 958 (Friendly, J., dissenting).
145. Compare id. at 948-49, with Leimbach v. Califano, 596 F.2d 300, 303-05
(8th Cir. 1979).
146. 450 U.S. 785 (1981).
147. Id. at 791.
148. Id. at 790. But see Recent Development, supra note 138, at 621:
The Court rejected the Second Circuit's approach to estoppel against
the government on three grounds. First, it did not believe that the SSA
agent's conduct was serious because the agent's conduct "did not cause
[Mrs. Hansen] to take action . .. or fail to take action . . . that [she]

could not correct any time." Second, the Court agreed with dissenting
Judge Friendly that a breach of the claims manual is insufficient to estop
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did not criticize the lower court opinions granting estoppel, but
distinguished them because those opinions either involved a writing or did not threaten the public treasury. 149 The Court never
specifically stated that the government could be estopped, but it
implied that this was possible by focusing on the kind of conduct

that could justify use of estoppel. 150 The Court also resurrected
the Merrill language that urged courts to protect the public treasury. 151 That language implies that the government's fiscal integrity is normally a sufficiently serious concern to require denying
estoppel.15 2 Once again, however, the Court avoided deciding
whether affirmative misconduct would permit estoppel, stating
only that the facts of Schweiker fell "far short" of affirmative
misconduct. 53 The decision thus reopened the question of what
constitutes affirmative misconduct.
Schweiker v. Hansen has been characterized as both a significant setback in the lower courts' use of estoppel against the government 154 and as a policing action whereby the Supreme Court
sought to rein in the lower courts and reinstate its leadership in
the controversy.15 Whatever its role, Schweiker failed to remove

the agency from asserting the written application requirement. Finally, the
Court found the Second Circuit's distinction between substantive eligibility and procedural requirements an inadequate basis for estoppel in this
case because Congress expressly provided that only one who "has filed application" for benefits may receive them.
Id. at 621 (footnotes omitted) (quoting Gressley v. Califano, 609 F.2d 1265, 1266
(7th Cir. 1979)).
149. 450 U.S. at 788-89 n.4. See also Recent Development, supra note 138, at
620.
150. Specifically the Court stated:
This Court has never decided what type of conduct by a Government employee will estop the Government from insisting upon compliance with
valid regulations governing the distribution of welfare benefits. In two
cases involving denial of citizenship, the Court has declined to decide
whether even "affirmative misconduct" would estop the Government from
denying citizenship, for in neither case was "affirmative misconduct"
involved.
450 U.S. at 788.
151. Federal Crop Ins. Corp. v. Merrill, 332 U.S. 380, 385 (1947).
152. See 450 U.S. at 788-89.
153. Id. at 790 (citing Montana v. Kennedy, 366 U.S. 308, 314 (1961)). See
also 450 U.S. at 789-90.
154. 4 K. DAvis, supra note 46, § 20:5, at 9.
155. See id. § 20:5, at 11-12. Professor Davis further commented that:
The Court sensed that the lower courts have gone beyond the Supreme
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the ambiguity from the standard for government estoppel.15 6 The
Court refused to hear arguments on this issue in spite of the obvious disagreement among the three opinion writers in Hansen v.
Harris.157 Although the Supreme Court denied estoppel in
Schweiker, the federal courts, relying upon the Court's dicta, began to base their government estoppel decisions upon a finding of
affirmative misconduct. 158 These lower court decisions, however,
are not all reconcilable with Schweiker. 59
B.

The First and Ninth Circuit Responses to Schweiker

In two significant immigration cases, the First and Ninth Circuits distinguished the Schweiker case, rendering it inapplicable
to all immigration cases.160
1.

The First Circuit and Akbarin v. Immigration and
NaturalizationService 61

An Iranian student was ordered to show cause why he should
not lose his student status because he had accepted part-time em-

ployment inconsistent with his student status. In response, the
student claimed he had acted in reliance upon misinformation

provided by an unidentified INS official. The First Circuit Court
of Appeals held that these facts, if proven, would estop the govCourt in recognizing the need for estopping the government, and the Second Circuit in the Hansen case did so more or less deliberately, following
its own instincts about the needs of justice. The Supreme Court's response
may have been more a reaction to the failure to follow its leadership than
a reaction to the merits of the particular problem. In its per curiam opinion, the Supreme Court at no point came to grips with the problem of
whether fairness to Mrs. Hansen required that the government be
estopped.
Id.
156. For criticism of this result, see Recent Development, supra note 138, at
618, 622-25.
157. 619 F.2d at 944-63.
158. See Note, supra note 72, at 131. For a good treatment of the law of
estoppel in the lower courts after Schweiker, see 4 K. DAviS, supra note 46, §
20:6, at 15-22.
159. See New Jersey v. Department of Health & Human Services, 670 F.2d
1284, 1296 n.17 (3d Cir. 1982) ("It is arguable ... that many of the 'moderntrend' cases are not reconcilable with language contained... in Schweiker v.
Hansen . . .").

160. See Hing, supra note 115, at 35.
161. 669 F.2d 839 (1st Cir. 1982).
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ernment' 6' and remanded the case for further proceedings.16 3 The
Akbarin court stated that, after Schweiker, estoppel cannot lie
against the government unless an individual reasonably relies
upon affirmative government misconduct.164 The First Circuit
also pointed out that the courts should apply the doctrine cautiously if the public fisc is threatened.'6 5 The Akbarin court concluded that Schweiker was distinguishable from the case before
the court because Schweiker concerned a threat to the public fisc
whereas immigration cases do not.6 6 The First Circuit then proposed its own two-part test for estoppel of the government in immigration cases. The test consists of the following two questions:
(1) "whether the Government's action was error, and, if the complaining party reacted to the error," and (2) "whether the action
was intended to or could reasonably have been intended to induce
reliance."' 6 7 This test, basically the traditional equitable estoppel
principle, refines earlier cases that relied on notions of "elementary fairness" to protect reliance interests.6 8 The test has been
characterized as "an outstanding example of a lower court's insistence that the government, despite [Schweiker v.] Hansen, still
may be estopped without 'affirmative misconduct.' "19 The spirit,
if not the letter, of Akbarin was adopted by the Ninth Circuit
when it considered Horacio Ramos Miranda's application for adjustment of his residency status.
2.

The Ninth Circuit and Miranda v. Immigration and
70
NaturalizationService1

Miranda, a Philippino who entered the United States in 1971
on a temporary visitor's visa, overstayed his visa period and mar-

162. Id. at 844.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.

Id. at 845.
Id. at 842.
Id.
Id. at 843.
Id.
See Hing, supra note 115, at 31.
4 K. DAVIs, supra note 46, § 20:6, at 17. The Akbarin court's attempt to

devise an alternate standard has been praised as "a significant advance in the
development of estoppel law in the immigration area," Hing, supra note 115, at
30, and has been criticized for leaving "the door open for evidence of equities
and other sympathetic facts." Id. at 33.
170. There are actually three Miranda opinions: Miranda v. INS, 638 F.2d
83 (9th Cir. 1980), vacated and remanded sub nom. INS v. Miranda, 454 U.S.
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ried a United States citizen in 1976. Miranda's bride petitioned
the INS to grant Miranda an immigrant visa as the spouse of a
United States citizen. Simultaneously, Miranda applied to have
the INS adjust his status to permanent resident alien. Miranda
would have been eligible for the adjustment if his wife's petition
had been granted, but the INS failed to act on Mrs. Miranda's
petition for eighteen months. Meanwhile, the Mirandas divorced
and Miranda's ex-wife withdrew her petition. The INS ordered
Miranda to show cause why he should not be deported, and the
immigration judge ruled against Miranda. Miranda appealed to
the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), arguing that the INS
should be estopped from denying his application because of unreasonable delay in processing his ex-wife's petition.17 1 The BIA
found no affirmative misconduct by the INS and refused to use
estoppel against them. 17 2 Miranda appealed and the Ninth Circuit
17 3
Court of Appeals reversed the BIA decision.

The Ninth Circuit cited two of its previous decisions in which it
held unreasonable delay to be affirmative misconduct.17 4 Compar-

ing those cases to the one at bar, the Ninth Circuit held that
"[tihe unexplained failure of the INS to act on the visa petition
for an eighteen-month period prior to the petitioner's withdrawal
following the breakup of Miranda's marriage was affirmative misconduct .

.

."

The court then reversed and remanded the case

for consideration of Miranda's application, instructing the INS to
"treat [Mrs. Miranda's] visa petition as if it were approved.

17 6

The Supreme Court granted certiorari, vacated the judgment, and
remanded the case to the Ninth Circuit "for further consideration
808 (1981) (mem.) [Miranda I]; Miranda v. INS, 673 F.2d 1105 (9th Cir. 1982)
[Miranda H], rev'd sub nom. INS v. Miranda, 103 S. Ct. 281 (1982) (per curiam)

[Miranda
171.
172.
173.
174.
banc);

mI].

103 S. Ct. at 282.
638 F.2d at 84.
Id.
638 F.2d at 83 (citing Villena v. INS, 622 F.2d 1352 (9th Cir. 1980) (en
Sun I1Yoo v. INS, 534 F.2d 1325 (9th Cir. 1976)). In Sun II Yoo, a one

year delay was held to constitute affirmative misconduct. Id. at 1328. The court
stated that "once an alien has gathered and supplied all relevant information

and has fulflled all requirements, INS officials are under a duty to accord to
him within a reasonable time the status to which he is entitled by law." Id. at

1328-29. For a list of other cases where courts excused noncompliance with time
limits, see Asimow, supra note 10, at 31-32 n.110.
175. 638 F.2d at 84.
176. Id.
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in light of Schweiker v. Hansen.'177

In a per curiam opinion on remand, the Ninth Circuit again
held that the INS was estopped. 17

The court distinguished

Schweiker on the grounds that Schweiker threatened the public
fisc, but Miranda did not; affirmative misconduct was found in
79
and, Mrs. Hansen had had an opMiranda, not in Schweiker;1
portunity to correct her mistake, but Miranda had no opportunity
to correct the problem. 8 0 Without citing the case, the Ninth Circuit essentially adopted the First Circuit's Akbarin reading of
Schweiker'8 ' and concluded that82 the Supreme Court's holding in
1
Schweiker was not controlling.

and Naturalization
C. The Supreme Court Reacts: Immigration
83
Miranda'
v.
Service
The Supreme Court granted certiorari' 84 and in a per curiam
decision reversed the Ninth Circuit. The Court found that
Schweiker could not be distinguished from Miranda and that the
INS had not engaged in affirmative misconduct. 8

5

Rejecting the

argument that Schweiker turned on public fisc considerations, the
Court stated that Schweiker gave "no indication that the Government would be estopped in the absence of the potential burden
on the fisc."' 8 6 Furthermore, the Court noted that enforcement of
the immigration laws is "becoming more difficult," and concluded
that, in order for the INS to function effectively, "[a]ppropriate
deference must be accorded its decisions."' 8 7 The Court denied

that Schweiker stood for the proposition that estoppel would lie
177. 454 U.S. at 808.
178. 673 F.2d at 1105-06.
179. 103 S. Ct. at 282.
180. 673 F.2d at 1106. But see Hing, supra note 115, at 28.
181. See supra text accompanying notes 162-69.
182. 673 F.2d at 1106.
183. 103 S. Ct. 281 (1982) (per curiam).
184. Id. at 282.
185. Id. at 283-84.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 284. The Court also rejected the Ninth Circuit's third distinction-that the harm to each party was different-in the following statement:
"Montana and Hibi make [it] clear that neither the Government's conduct nor
the harm to the respondent is sufficient to estop the Government from enforcing
the conditions imposed by Congress for residency in this country." Id. at 283.
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against the government for affirmative misconduct.1 18 The Court,
however, found that the Ninth Circuit had correctly considered,
as a preliminary matter, if affirmative misconduct was present, 189
but disagreed with the Ninth Circuit's conclusion that affirmative
misconduct was present. Instead, the Court cited Hibi and Montana, cases in which it had denied estoppel, and concluded that
the failure to process a petition within eighteen months was not
as blameworthy as the government conduct in Hibi and Montana.9 0 Thus, because the misstatement in Montana'9 1 was "far
short of misconduct" that might allow for estoppel of the government, there was no affirmative misconduct in Miranda. 92 Finally,
the Court again declined to state if affirmative misconduct would
precipitate estoppel of the government, opining only that proof of
government failure "to process promptly an application falls far
'193
short of establishing such conduct.

IV.

ANALYSIS

The most obvious effect of the Supreme Court's Miranda opinion was to halt the First and Second Circuits' attempts to distinguish Schweiker out of the immigration field.1'9 The Court
thereby implies that congressional immigration policies deserve
the same judicial protection as that given to the public fisc.195 By
rescuing Schweiker, the Court reintroduced the principle that,
even in immigration cases, there may be overriding public interests that prevent estoppel, even when affirmative misconduct can
be shown.

188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.

Id. at 282.
Id. at 283.
Id.
Montana v. Kennedy, 366 U.S. 308, 314-15 (1961).
103 S. Ct. at 283.
Id. at 284. Justice Marshall filed a dissent in which he argued that the

case should never have been granted certiorari, and that it should not have been

disposed of summarily. Id.
194. Because Schweiker never explicitly rejected the Second Circuit's substantive/procedural distinction, see supra text accompanying note 148, that
mode of analysis arguably has survived Miranda as well.
195. The Supreme Court could have cited Utah Power for the proposition
that "laches or neglect of duty on the part of officers or agents of the government is no defense to a suit by it to enforce valid congressional policy on immigration." See Utah Power & Light Co. v. United States, 243 U.S. 389, 409
(1917).
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In Miranda the Court refused to estop the government and
summarily disposed of the estoppel issue in a per curiam decision
without oral argument. Thus, Miranda is weak precedent for the
proposition that the government may, in some circumstances, be
estopped. Yet, the Court continues to imply exactly that when it
declines, in case after case, to address the issue it reserved in
Hibi: "whether affirmative misconduct in a particular case would
estop the Government from enforcing the immigration laws." 196
The Supreme Court has not defined affirmative misconduct or
articulated a specific standard for its application. In Miranda the
Court implicitly adopted the comparative test of Santiago v. INS
as an initial test for affirmative misconduct. 197 Without specifi-

cally citing the Ninth Circuit opinion, the Supreme Court compared the delay complained of in Miranda with the statements
and actions of government agents in Hibi and Montana198 to determine if those in Miranda were "more blameworthy."1 99 The
Court thereby established a minimum threshold for affirmative
misconduct and offered some guidance to practitioners and
judges: if the action complained of is not as bad as that in Hibi or
Montana, it cannot be affirmative misconduct. The Court in Miranda also arguably rejects the First Circuit's Akbarin alternative
to affirmative misconduct.200
Finally, it is possible to derive from Miranda a rudimentary
analysis for determining when estoppel of the government will
not be allowed. The following analysis, consisting of five questions, is grounded upon a synthesis of the Santiago comparative
test,201 which the Court clandestinely adopted,20 2 and the Akbarin
description of the state of government estoppel after
Schweiker. °3 If the facts of a case do not permit an affirmative
answer to each question, then the Supreme Court would probably
deny estoppel.
1) Has there been reliance upon some conduct of a government agent?
196. 103 S. Ct. at 284.
197. 526 F.2d 488 (9th Cir. 1975). See supra text accompanying notes 134-36.

198. See 103 S. Ct. at 283.
199. Id.
200. See supra text accompanying note 167.
201. See supra text accompanying notes 134-36.

202. See supra text accompanying notes 190-92.
203. See supra text accompanying note 164.
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2) If so, was this reliance reasonable?
3) Was or will the party be injured as a result of this
reliance?
4) Was the government agent's conduct "affirmative
misconduct?

20 4

5) If there has been affirmative misconduct on the part of
government officials, would estoppel pose any threat to the
public fisc (or to any other valid congressional policy, such as
effective implementation of the immigration laws)?
The flaw in this analysis is the inability to predict when estoppel
will be allowed against the government. Only the Supreme Court
can correct that flaw. At present, if all the above conditions are
satisfied, the most one can say is that, perhaps, the government
will be estopped.
V.

CONCLUSION

It would seem that the Supreme Court's position on estoppel of
the government has changed very little since Mr. Lee was fleeced
by Mr. Munroe. Recent opinions, however, at least suggest that
the Court is willing to consider estopping the government in a
case involving egregious conduct by a government official that
causes severe injury to a hapless individual. The only clear teaching of the Court's action in these cases is that it will not stand
aside for subordinate court development of the estoppel doctrine.
For the present, the standard will be affirmative misconduct as
set out in Montana, Hibi, Schweiker, and Miranda. Unfortunately, this fairly ambiguous standard will continue to generate
litigation.
If the Simpson-Mazzoli bill is enacted by the 98th Congress,
procedures implemented by the bill are likely to be fertile ground
for this litigation. Most, if not all, of these suits will be ineffective
because the Miranda decision suggests that the Supreme Court is

204.

For this determination, compare the facts against those in Hibi, Mon-

tana, Schweiker, and Miranda. If the facts do not show conduct as bad as, or
worse than that in any one of those four cases, there can be no estoppel. If the

action complained of is worse than that in the other cases, then it may amount
to affirmative misconduct.
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not likely to permit estoppel of the government, especially when
estoppel would interfere with the effective implementation of the
immigration laws.
Daniel M. FitzPatrick

THE SUPREME COURT'S VERLINDEN DECISION: A
RETREAT TO ACTIVISM
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INTRODUCTION

Rarely is the Supreme Court presented with a case addressing
issues of exceptional international and domestic significance. Verlinden B. V. v. CentralBank of Nigeria1 was such a case. The nature and quantity of the amicus briefs that were filed with the

Supreme Court prior to oral argument of the case indicates Verlinden's2 significance. The United States, the Rule of Law Committee, the Association of the Bar of the City of New York, and
1. 103 S. Ct. 1962 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Verlinden III].
2. See Supreme Court Docket Extract No. 81-920-CFX, Verlinden B.V. v.
Central Bank of Nigeria, docketed Nov. 13, 1982.
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the Republic of Guinea submitted briefs.' These briefs discussed
domestic concerns, including federalism4 and the separation of
powers,5 as well as international issues such as sovereign immunity6 and the abrogation of treaty rights.7
Apart from the substantive focus of Verlinden, one of the most
intriguing aspects of the case was the Supreme Court's activist
posture concerning resolution of the dispute. The Court managed
to find a way, albeit cloaked in "plain meaning" language, to permit the appellant, Verlinden, to stumble its way into the United
States federal courts. In so doing, the Court avoided the ground
swell of criticism that would have resulted had it followed the
3. Id. The Republic of Guinea had a substantial interest in the case for two
reasons. First, Guinea was the appellant in a case then pending before the Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia, which involved issues virtually identical
to those found in Verlinden. See In re Maritime Int'l Nominees Establishment
v. Republic of Guinea, 505 F. Supp. 141 (D.D.C. 1981), rev'd, 693 F.2d 1094
(D.C. Cir. 1982). The plaintiff, Maritime International Nominees Establishment,
invoked the federal jurisdictional grant contained in the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1330 (1976), and obtained a ruling that arbitration
between the litigants was permissible "before an American panel, under American Arbitration Association Rules, in English." See Brief of Amicus Curiae, The
Republic of Guinea, in support of Respondent at 2, Verlinden III, 103 S. Ct. at
1962 [hereinafter cited as Guinea Brief]. Significantly, the contract which
spawned the dispute provided for arbitration under the auspices of the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes ("ICSID"). Maritime Int'l,
505 F. Supp. at 142. The Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes
between States and Nationals of Other States, Aug. 27, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270,
T.I.A.S. No. 6090, 575 U.N.T.S. 159, provides for ICSID arbitration, which
would have ordained an international panel governed by internationally approved rules. See Guinea Brief, supra, at 2. Under those rules, sovereign immunity is preserved. See id. As a result of this litigation, a United States arbitration panel awarded $27,000,000 to Maritime International, a result unobtainable
under ICSID arbitration. See id. Because an award of that size potentially could
have crippled Guinean currency, id., Guinea "lodged a formal diplomatic protest
with the Department of State." Id. Clearly this sort of decision has international
import significantly affecting United States foreign relations.
Second, Guinea, like other nations, is concerned about situations in which it
might be brought into United States courts to defend claims. Id. This concern is
of special importance to developing nations concerned with the workings of
Western judicial systems. Id. The United States must be aware of these concerns in order to maintain appropriate diplomatic and trade relations with developing nations.
4. See infra notes 217-27 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 195-205 and accompanying text.

6. See infra notes 93-135 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 239-43 and accompanying text.
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Second Circuit in holding the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
(FSIA)8 unconstitutional. 9 These divergent results are not surprising, though, in light of the FSIA's blatant incongruity.
Bluntly stated, the FSIA is "a [six]-year-old statutory labyrinth
that, owing to the numerous interpretive questions engendered by
its bizarre structure and vague provisions, has during its brief existence been a financial boon for the private bar but a constant
bane of the federal judiciary." 10 It is against this backdrop that
the Supreme Court's Verlinden decision must be analyzed.
II.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The Verlinden controversy arose "out of one of the most enormous commercial disputes in history."" Indeed, the dispute
spawned litigation throughout the world.1 2 In 1975 the Republic
of Nigeria contracted to purchase extraordinary quantities of
Portland cement."' Nigeria executed 109 contracts with sixtyeight suppliers to purchase sixteen million metric tons of cement
14
at the cost of approximately one billion dollars.
In April 1975 Verlinden, 5 a Dutch corporation, contracted to
supply Nigeria with 240,000 metric tons of cement over the course
of several months at sixty dollars per ton."6 Nigeria promised to
8. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-1611 (1976).
9. See Brief for Petitioner at 7, Verlinden III, 103 S. Ct. at 1962.
10. Gibbons v. Udaras Gaeltachta, 549 F. Supp. 1094, 1105 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
11. Texas Trading & Milling Corp. v. Republic of Nigeria, 647 F.2d 300, 302
(2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1148 (1982).
12. E.g., Reale Int'l, Inc. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 647 F.2d 330 (2d
Cir. 1981), on remand, 562 F. Supp. 54 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); Gemini Shipping, Inc. v.
Foreign Trade Org. for Chems. & Foodstuffs, 647 F.2d 317 (2d Cir. 1981); Ipitrade Int'l, S.A. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 465 F. Supp. 824 (D.D.C. 1978)
(enforcing Int'l Chamber of Commerce arbitration award (Apr. 25, 1978)); Hispano Americana Mercantil, S.A. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, [1979] 2 Lloyd's
L.R. 277; Trendtex Trading Corp. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, [1977] 2 W.L.R.
356, Judgment of Dec. 2, 1975, District Court, Frankfurt, 16 I.L.M. 501.
13. Texas Trading & Milling Corp., 647 F.2d at 302. Nigeria's massive development projects reflected the sudden and dynamic increases in the balance of
payments resulting from its huge exportation of crude oil. Id.
14. Id. at 303.
15. Verlinden B.V. is a Dutch corporation maintaining its principal offices in
Amsterdam, Netherlands. Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 647 F.2d
320, 322 (2d Cir. 1981) [hereinafter cited as Verlinden II], rev'd, 103 S. Ct. 1962
(1983).
16. Id. The contracts executed by Nigeria with each of its suppliers were
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secure the contract by an "Irrevocable, Transferable abroad, Divisible and Confirmed Letter of Credit in favour of the seller for
the total purchase price through Slavenburg's Bank, Amsterdam,
Netherlands.

'17

Verlinden and Nigeria agreed that the contract1 8

would be governed by the laws of the Netherlands.19 Any disputes
concerning the contract were to be settled by arbitration before
the International Chamber of Commerce in Paris, France. 20 Nigeria, however, failed to honor the terms of its contract completely.
This letter of credit (Morgan Letter of Credit) was established
instead at the Central Bank of Nigeria, 21 and was made payable
through the Morgan Guaranty Trust Company in New York
(Morgan). 22 Moreover, the Morgan Letter of Credit was unconvirtually identical. Texas Trading & Milling Corp., 647 F.2d at 303. Apparently,

the contracts were mimeographed in blank and details as to individual suppliers
were written in. Id.
17. Verlinden II, 647 F.2d at 322. That letter of credit was supposed to be
governed by the Uniform Customs and Practice for Documentary Credits. Id.
(citing INT'L CHAMBER OF COMMERCE BROCHURE No. 222 (1962 rev. ed.)).
18. Specifically, the "Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Defense, Lagos...
on behalf of the Federal Military Government of the Federal Republic of Nigeria" signed the contract. Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 488 F. Supp.
1284, 1287 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) [hereinafter cited as Verlinden I], aff'd, 647 F.2d
320 (2d Cir. 1981), rev'd, 103 S. Ct. 1962 (1983). The contract called for shipment at the rate of 20,000 metric tons per month to commence 45 days after
Verlinden received the documentary irrevocable letter of credit in its favor. Id.
at 1287. Under the contract, demurrage was set at "a rate not exceeding $3,500
per diem per vessel," if the discharge rate of 1,000 tons per day of cement was
not satisfied. Id. Demurrage payments were to commence on the first day after a
ship's arrival at its designated Nigerian port. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Central Bank of Nigeria is an organ of the Federal Republic of Nigeria,
Verlinden II, 647 F.2d at 322 n.4, and performs "functions similar to the United
States Federal Reserve and the Bank of England." Id. The Central Bank was
established in 1958 pursuant to the Central Bank of Nigeria Act of 1958. Texas
Trading & Milling Corp., 647 F.2d at 304 n.12. Its express functions are to: "Issue legal tender currency in Nigeria, to maintain external reserves to safeguard
the international value of that currency, to promote monetary stability and a
sound financial structure in Nigeria and to act as banker and financial adviser to
the Federal Government." Id. (quoting § 4(1) of the Central Bank of Nigeria Act
of 1958).
22. Verlinden II, 647 F.2d at 322. Nigeria's choice of Morgan as its advising
bank was not surprising. Morgan and Nigeria had a long-standing relationship.
Central Bank used Morgan as its correspondent bank for a multitude of transactions in the United States. Texas Trading & Milling Corp., 647 F.2d at 304. As
outlined by Judge Kaufman for the Second Circuit Court of Appeals:
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firmed and not divisible.23
In August 1975 Verlinden subcontracted for the purchase of the
cement it had promised to ship to Nigeria. 4 Shortly thereafter,
Verlinden's subcontractor began to bag and ship the cement to
Nigeria. Other subcontractors who were beneficiaries of identical
cement contracts also began to bag and ship cement.2 5 Hundreds
of vessels started to arrive at the Nigerian port of Lagos. The port
facilities, capable of accepting only one to five million tons of cement annually, were woefully inadequate to handle the sixteen
million tons Nigeria had ordered.
By September, the Nigerian ports were bottlenecked." As demurrage accrued and suppliers continued to dispatch cement-

Employees of Central Bank regularly came to Morgan for training seminars. On Nigeria's request, Morgan made payments to Nigerian students
in the United States, to American corporations to which Nigeria owed
money, and to the Nigerian embassy and consulates in the United States.
Indeed, Nigeria used Morgan to make payments (for salaries, operating
expenses, and the like) to Nigerian embassies in other countries as well.
Until 1974, Morgan had the right to draw up to $1 million per day from
Nigeria's account at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York to satisfy Nigeria's obligations. Nigeria raised the limit to $3 million per day in 1974,
and Morgan enjoyed unlimited drawing rights on Nigeria's funds beginning in November 1975. Central Bank kept over $200 million of securities
in a custody account at Morgan. Morgan advised as much as $200 million
in letters of credit established by Nigeria, and confirmed, in addition, letters of credit totalling at least $70 million more.
Id. at 304-05.
23. Verlinden I, 488 F. Supp. at 1287. The Morgan Letter also differed significantly in other respects from the cement contract. For example, it failed to
specify when demurrage payments would begin. Id. As initially drafted, Verlinden deemed the Morgan Letter to be "commercially ineffective and unusable."
Id. Consequently, Verlinden requested amendments to the Letter. Id. Although
Nigeria honored these requests, Morgan did not notify Verlinden of the adjustments until September 1975. Id.
24. Verlinden II, 647 F.2d at 322. Verlinden subcontracted with Interbuco
Anstalt, a Liechtenstein corporation. Specifically, Interbuco agreed to provide
Verlinden with 240,000 tons of cement at $51 per ton. Id. Verlinden promised to
pay Interbuco five dollars per ton if Verlinden breached the contract. Id.
25. Texas Trading & Milling Corp., 647 F.2d at 305.
26. Verlinden II, 647 F.2d at 322. As early as July 1975, the Nigerian
harbors were desperately overworked. Over 400 ships needed to be unloaded.
Texas Trading & Milling Corp., 647 F.2d at 305. Although Nigeria may have
acted imprudently by entering into an extraordinary number of cement contracts, its past experiences did not prepare it adequately for this shipping
nightmare. In fact, Nigeria expected only 20% of its suppliers to perform. Id.
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laden vessels, Nigeria responded frantically. First, the Nigeria
Ports Authority issued a regulation requiring ships sailing for Nigeria to notify the Ports Authority two months prior to setting
sail with information concerning their projected time of arrival.2 7
The regulation further provided that the Ports Authority would
"co-ordinate all sailing and that it would refus[e] service to vessels" that did not comply with its terms. 8 One week later Nigeria
formally requested its suppliers to stop loading, chartering ships,
and sending cement.2 9 Then, Nigeria took action "on a scale previously unknown to international commerce," 30 unilaterally instructing Morgan not to honor any letters of credit, unless the
supplier submitted a statement from the Central Bank indicating
approval of the payment.3 1 Morgan notified each supplier of Nigeria's instructions and began refusing to pay on the letters of
credit.2 In a final effort to unclog its congested ports, Nigeria
threatened to impose criminal sanctions against any ship that attempted to enter a Nigerian port without first obtaining official
permission two months prior to sailing.33 Concurrently, Nigeria
'34
"invit[ed] its suppliers to cancel the contracts.

Verlinden did not cancel its contract and instead initiated suit
in the Southern District of New York against the Central Bank.3 5
Verlinden argued that Nigeria's actions constituted an anticipatory breach of its letter of credit and that the FSIA provided
27.
ment
28.
29.
30.

Texas Trading & Milling Corp., 647 F.2d at 305. Specifically, GovernNotice No. 1434 was issued on August 9, 1975. Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

31. Id.
32. Id. The ramifications of Nigeria's unilateral alteration of the letters of
credit were not unknown to Central Bank. Morgan explained the possibility of
extensive litigation to Central Bank personnel, but Central Bank insisted upon
nonpayment. The Deputy of Central Bank stated that the Nigerian Government
might even sue Morgan, if Morgan honored the letters as initially drafted. Id.
33. Id. Decree No. 40 of December 19, 1975, contained this prohibition. Id.
34. Id. Nigeria held a meeting in New York to inform various members of
the United States financial community of its position. As a result, over 40 suppliers settled. Id. at 306.
35. Verlinden I, 488 F. Supp. at 1284.
36, Id. at 1286. Central Bank did not deny during trial that its instructions
to Morgan were an anticipatory breach in violation of the Documentary Credits
Brochure. Verlinden H, 647 F.2d at 322 n.7. Article 3 of the Uniform Documentary Credits Brochure provides in relevant part:
An irrevocable credit is a definite undertaking on the part of an issuing
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federal jurisdiction over the suit.37 The Central Bank responded

that the FSIA did not confer jurisdiction upon a federal district
court to adjudicate a dispute solely between foreign entities.38
A.

Verlinden I: The District Court Refusal to Entertain the
Case

After rigorously analyzing the FSIA's jurisdictional provisions,
the Southern District of New York adopted the Central Bank's
position that personal jurisdiction over the suit was lacking.39 The
district court focused initially upon the FSIA's jurisdictional probank and constitutes the engagement of that bank to the beneficiary...
that the provisions for payment, acceptance or negotiation contained in
the credit will be duly fulfilled . . . Such undertakings can neither be
modified nor cancelled without the agreement of all concerned.
INT'L CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, THE UNIFORM CUSTOMS AND PRACTICE FOR Docu-

MENTARY CREDITS (1962 revision) (CHAMBER OF COMMERCE BROCHURE No. 222).

37. 28 U.S.C. § 1330 (1976). Section 1330 provides in relevant part:
(a) The district courts shall have original jurisdiction without regard to
amount in controversy of any nonjury civil action against a foreign state as
defined in section 1603(a) of this title as to any claim for relief in personam with respect to which the foreign state is not entitled to immunity
either under sections 1605-1607 of this title or under any applicable international agreement.
(b) Personal jurisdiction over a foreign state shall exist as to every claim
for relief over which the district courts have jurisdiction under subsection
(a) ....
Id.
Specifically, Verlinden posited that by virtue of its contract with Interbuco,
Verlinden exposed itself to potential liability for liquidated damages. Verlinden
1, 488 F. Supp. at 1288. Accordingly, Verlinden sought recovery of damages for
payments made and owing to Interbuco and compensatory damages totalling
$4,660,000 for lost profits, counsel fees, and expenses. Id. Verlinden also sought
substantial punitive damages. Id.
38. Verlinden II, 647 F.2d at 323. In total, Central Bank presented five motions to dismiss the action. They were based upon:
(1) lack of subject matter jurisdiction; (2) lack of in personam jurisdiction
over Central Bank based upon sovereign immunity and the act of state
doctrine; (3) its motion for summary judgment on the merits; (4) also its
motion . . . to be relieved of an order directing that it instruct Morgan
Guaranty to keep funds in a separate account sufficient to satisfy any
judgment plaintiff may recover; and (5) plaintiff's renewed motion for the
entry of default judgment based upon defendant's failure timely to file its
answer.
Verlinden I, 488 F. Supp. at 1288.
39. Verlinden I, 488 F. Supp. at 1302.
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visions. Section 1330(a) gives the federal district courts jurisdiction "as to any claim for relief in personam with respect to which
the foreign state is not entitled to immunity . . . under sections
confers personal jurisdiction
94
".. Section 1330(b)
1605-1607 ..
automatically if subject matter jurisdiction exists.41 Thus, the district court focused upon those situations when subject matter jurisdiction exists or, in other words, when a foreign sovereign is not
immune from suit under the FSIA. Pursuant to the FSIA, a foreign sovereign is not immune from suit if it engages in commercial activity in the United States or waives its immunity.42 The
court concluded that Central Bank did not engage in commercial
activity under the FSIA's three-prong definition.
The first prong, "commercial activity carried on in the United
States, 43 was not satisfied because Central Bank lacked substantial contact with the United States. Central Bank was neither engaging in a regular course of business in the United States, nor
was it a party to a particular commercial transaction in the
United States.44 The Verlinden I court concluded that Verlinden's commercial transaction was insufficient to confer jurisdiction because the letter of credit and its underlying contract concerned commercial activity that took place overseas; in addition,
the letter of credit and contract (1) were formed abroad, (2)
benefitted foreign entities, and (3) contained substantive provisions that provided for performance of the contract outside of the
United States by non-United States citizens. 45 The court deter-

40. 28 U.S.C. § 1330(a).
41. Id. § 1330(b).
42. Id. § 1605(a)(1)-(2); see also infra notes 122-26 and accompanying text.
43. Id. § 1605(a)(2).
44. Verlinden I, 488 F. Supp. at 1294; see FSIA, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1603(d)-(e)
("commercial activity carried on in the United States by a foreign state" means

commercial activity carried on by such state and having substantial contact with
the United States).
45. Verlinden I, 488 F. Supp. at 1294. The court's reasoning was buttressed
by the terms of the underlying contract. Specifically, the contract contained no

provision indicating that either Verlinden or Central Bank "intended to invoke
the benefits and privilege of [United States] law." Id. In fact, disputes under the
contract were to be governed by Dutch law. Id. Moreover, the court interpreted
the FSIA to require a "nexus between the forum and the particular facts giving
rise to the cause of action." Id. at 1296. Thus, even though Central Bank kept
large sums of United States dollars on deposit at Morgan, sent its employees to
Morgan for training seminars, and regularly advised letters of credit through
Morgan, a "regular course of business" for FSIA purposes was lacking. Id. at
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mined that the second prong, "an act performed in the United
States in connection with a commercial activity of the foreign
state elsewhere, ' " was not fulfilled because the instruction not to
honor the letters of credit, the source of Verlinden's claim, was
issued in Nigeria.47 The final prong, "an act outside the ...
United States .

.

. that causes a direct effect in the United

States,"48 was also found to be inapplicable. Relying upon the
FSIA's legislative history and case law, the district court stated
that the exception applied only if a substantial effect within the
United States was a direct and foreseeable result of the conduct
abroad. 49 Accordingly, the Southern District concluded that because the locus of Verlinden's injury was not within the United
States and because the parties never used the protection of New
York law, a direct and substantial effect in the United States did
not exist to allow the court personal jurisdiction over Verlinden.50
Finally, the district court examined the relationship between the
litigants and concluded that Central Bank did not waive its sovereign immunity.51 Central Bank did not expressly waive immunity,
nor did it implicitly waive immunity when it consented to arbitra52
tion in a third-party nation.

1294-97.

46. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2).
47.

Verlinden I, 488 F. Supp. at 1297. The Southern District believed that it

was irrelevant that "'[t]he repudiating instructions had their effect and found
their target in the U.S. not in Nigeria.' "Id. (quoting Plaintiff's Memorandum of
Law in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss and for Summary Judgment at 11, Verlinden I, 488 F. Supp. 1284).
48. FSIA, 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2).
49. Verlinden I, 488 F. Supp. at 1298. As a ground for this assertion the
court cited H.R. REP. No. 1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 6, 19, reprinted in 1976
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 6604, 6618 [hereinafter cited as H.R. REP. No.
1487], which adopts the principles contained in the

RESTATEMENT (SEcoND)

THE LAW OF FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES § 18

OF

(1965). Section 18 of

the RESTATEMENT sets forth the standard requiring substantial, direct, and forseeable effects before foreign sovereign immunity is lost. See id.; see also Verlinden I, 488 F. 2d at 1298. The court also cited Harris v. VAO Intourist, Moscow,
481 F. Supp. 1056, 1062-63 (E.D.N.Y. 1979), to the same effect. See Verlinden I,
488 F. Supp. at 1298 n.67.
50. Verlinden I, 488 F. Supp. at 1299.
51. Id. at 1300-02.
52. Id. at 1302. Although this argument appears tenuous, some cases support
the position. The court in Ipitrade Int'l S.A. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 465
F. Supp. 824 (D.D.C. 1978), another case resulting from the Nigerian cement

fiasco, held that Nigeria's choice of European laws and a European forum to
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Thus, the Southern District determined that none of the exceptions to the Act were applicable and granted Central Bank's motion to dismiss the complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction
under the FSIA. 53 This decision, therefore, prevented a foreign
plaintiff from suing a foreign defendant in a federal district court
when neither party had de minimis contacts with the United
States.
B. Verlinden II: The Second Circuit Steps Boldly
One year later, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals addressed
the Verlinden dispute and "sua sponte.

raised the question of

. .

Article III jurisdiction on oral argument .

.

.-

54

"[W]ithout pro-

viding an opportunity for . . . argument . . . [on] the issue, the
Court of Appeals held the Act pro tanto unconstitutional. ' 55 In

reaching its decision, the Second Circuit looked to the Constitution, unlike the district court, which grounded its holding in the
FSIA. Both courts, however, concluded that the FSIA could not
confer upon the federal courts jurisdiction over the suit.5 6 The

district court 57 and the Second Circuit also agreed that under
some circumstances the FSIA permitted a suit brought by an
alien against a foreign state. 58 After examining the Constitution5 9
resolve disputes was a waiver of sovereign immunity in the United States. Id. at
826.
53. Verlinden I, 488 F. Supp. at 1302.
54. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 9, at 7.

55. Id.
56. The Southern District reached a conclusion contrary to that of the Second Circuit concerning whether the FSIA constitutionally could provide subject

matter jurisdiction for a suit like Verlinden. The Southern District opined:
[E]ven though the plaintiff's claim is one grounded upon common law, the

case is one that "arises under" a federal law because the complaint compels the application of [a] uniform federal standard governing assertions of

sovereign immunity. In short, the Immunities Act injects an essential federal element into all suits brought against foreign states . . . . [T]he presence of aliens on both sides of this dispute does not deprive the Court of
subject matter jurisdiction.

Verlinden I, 488 F. Supp. at 1292-93.
57. Id. at 1292.
58. Verlinden II, 647 F.2d at 324. The express wording of the FSIA, however, would seem to allow this type of suit. See infra text accompanying note

127.
59.

The Second Circuit examined article III of the Constitution which ex-

tends judicial power to the federal courts. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. Clause 1
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and the statutory federal question grant, 0 however, the Second
Circuit found the general jurisdictional provision of the FSIA to
be a naked grant of power without the required constitutional underpinning.61 Thus, the determinative issue for the Second Circuit was whether Congress had the authority within the limits of
the Constitution to confer jurisdiction over Verlinden, not
whether the parties fit within the language of the FSIA.62

of § 2 is expressly on point. It provides in full:

The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising
under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties
made, or which shall be made, under their Authority;-to all Cases affecting
Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls;-to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction;-to Controversies to which the United
States shall be a Party;-to Controversies between two or more States;-between a State and Citizens of another State;-between Citizens of different
States;-between Citizens of the same State claiming Lands under Grants
of different States, and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.
Id. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. Congress' power to confer jurisdiction is circumscribed by
that clause-jurisdictional grants beyond its parameters are impermissible. See,
e.g., Hodgson v. Bowerbank, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 303 (1809); Federal Election
Comm'n v. Central Long Island Tax Reform Immediately Comm., 616 F.2d 45,
51 (2d Cir. 1980)(per curium)(en banc).
60. The Second Circuit found the statutory federal question grant contained
in 28 U.S.C. § 1331 relevant because of its similarity to the crucial first phrase of
U.S. CONST., art III, § 2, cl. 1. See Verlinden II, 647 F.2d at 325. Section 1331
provides in full: "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction over all civil
actions .. . [arising] under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United
States." 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
61. See Verlinden II, 647 F.2d at 324-30.
62. Id. at 324. Indeed, the first issue addressed by the Second Circuit was
whether both Verlinden and Central Bank were parties contemplated by the
FSIA. See infra note 120 and text accompanying note 127 (statutory provisions).
The court held that Central Bank was an "instrumentality of a foreign state"
under 28 U.S.C. § 1603(b) qualifying it as a foreign state under 28 U.S.C. §
1603(a), and therefore, Verlinden's action was "against a foreign state" under
the FSIA. Verlinden II, 647 F.2d at 323. This conclusion was unavoidable under
the FSIA. Section 1603(b) provides in relevant part:
An "agency or instrumentality of a foreign state" means any entity (1) which is a separate legal person, corporate or otherwise, and
(2) which is an organ of a foreign state or political subdivision thereof, and
(3) which is neither a citizen of a State of the United States . . .nor created under the laws of any third country.
FSIA, 28 U.S.C. § 1603(b) (1976). Its counterpart, 28 U.S.C. § 1603(a), provides
the definition of a foreign state and stipulates: "A 'foreign state', . . . includes a
political subdivision of a foreign state or an agency or instrumentality of a for-
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The Verlinden II court began its analysis of that issue by focusing on prior Supreme Court interpretations of article III of the
Constitution. 3 In several decisions the Supreme Court has held
that Congress may not grant federal jurisdiction beyond the
bounds of article 111.64 Thus, to fulfill federal jurisdictional re-

quirements every case must be supported by a congressional
grant of jurisdiction that is grounded in the Constitution. 5 The
court found that the only colorable constitutional basis for Verlinden's suit was the first phrase of article III.6 That clause permits the federal courts to exercise jurisdiction over "all Cases, in
Law and Equity, arisingunder this Constitution, the Laws of the
United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under
their Authority.

'8 7

Because that clause has been interpreted in-

frequently, the Verlinden I court turned to the many Supreme
Court interpretations of the identical "arising under" language in
28 U.S.C. section 13318 and concluded that Verlinden's suit did
not arise under federal law.
The Second Circuit grouped the Supreme Court's interpretations of the "arising under" language into three categories. The
court found that the first group, lawsuits in which federal law
"creates the cause of action," 69 was inapplicable. Because the

eign state as defined in subsection (b)." The Second Circuit next examined Verlinden's qualification under the Act. After examining the FSIA's legislative history and renowned treatises, the court concluded that Congress had formed no
clear intent regarding a plaintiffs citizenship under the FSIA, and stated that a
suit brought by an alien against a foreign state in federal district court is theoretically possible under the FSIA's terms. Verlinden II, 647 F.2d at 324.
63. Verlinden II, 647 F.2d at 324.
64. See supra note 59.
65. See, e.g., Hodgson, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 303 (1809).
66. Verlinden II, 647 F.2d at 325.
67. U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 2, cl. 1 (emphasis added). The court first examined
article III's diversity grant, which provides that the federal judicial power extends to "Controversies ...

between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and for-

eign States, Citizens or Subjects." Id. Because that phrase fails to address expressly a case between two aliens, it cannot be relied upon as a constitutional
basis for a suit by an alien against a foreign sovereign.
68. Verlinden II, 647 F.2d at 325.
69. Id. at 326. Verlinden II acknowledged that the words "arising under" in
article III of the Constitution may have a meaning at variance with the identical
language contained in 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Indeed, the court stated: "The substantial identity of the words does not ... require, on that score alone, an identical
interpretation. The differences in the functions of the two enactments, in the
circumstances surrounding their adoption and in their further provisions justify
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FSIA provides that "the foreign state shall be liable in the same
manner and to the same extent as a private individual... ,,,17
the court determined that the FSIA was not intended to affect
substantive liability."1 Rather the Act was designed merely to pro7' 2
vide "access to the courts to resolve ordinary legal disputes.
Thus, the FSIA did not create a new cause of action. Also, Verlinden's suit was deemed not to fall within the second group of suits,
those in which the plaintiff's complaint requires the interpretation of a federal law.73 The court of appeals cited two reasons for

this conclusion. First, Verlinden's "well pleaded" complaint did
not demonstrate a need for the court to "interpret" the FSIA because the affirmative defense of sovereign immunity would be
raised only in a response by Central Bank.7 ' Second, according to
the Second Circuit, the FSIA neither confers substantive rights
nor requires the construction of a law that confers substantive
rights.75 Specifically, Judge Kaufman opined that because the
FSIA regulates only judicial practice7 6 a lawsuit brought pursuant
to the FSIA cannot fall within the second group; otherwise, the
court would create jurisdiction over a claim where none existed

inquiry as to whether their meaning is different." Verlinden II, 647 F.2d at 327
(quoting Shulman & Jaegerman, Some JurisdictionalLimitations on Federal
Procedure,45 YALE L.J. 393, 405 n.47 (1936)).
70. 28 U.S.C. § 1606 (1976). The statute provides in full:
§ 1606. Extent of Liability. As to any claim for relief with respect to which
a foreign state is not entitled to immunity under section 1605 or 1607 of
this chapter, the foreign state shall be liable in the same manner and to
the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances; but a
foreign state except for an agency or instrumentality thereof shall not be
liable for punitive damages; if, however, in any case wherein death was
caused, the law of the place where the action or omission occurred provides, or has been construed to provide, for damages only punitive in nature, the foreign state shall be liable for actual or compensatory damages
measured by the pecuniary injuries resulting from such death which were
incurred by the persons for whose benefit the action was brought.
Id.
71. Verlinden II, 647 F.2d at 326.
72. Id. at 326-27.
73. Id. at 327. For a discussion concerning suits "arising under" federal law
because of the need for interpretation of a federal law, see infra notes 157-82
and accompanying text.
74. Verlinden II,647 F.2d at 326-27.
75. Id. at 327.
76. Id.
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before. 7 Finally, the court summarily dismissed the possibility of
including Verlinden's claim in the third group. That group requires the imposition of "federal common law" in certain situations. In so ruling, the court stated that the Verlinden situation
lacked a national interest strong enough to warrant preemption of
state law by "judge-made" federal law. 8
The Second Circuit proffered two cogent, alternative grounds
for holding that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to
hear the suit. First, the court stated that the Framers' primary
intent in creating federal courts was to protect constitutional
rights. 70 Accordingly, the court said that the Framers' concern for
uniformity in the interpretation of federal laws pertained only to
those laws regulating conduct.8 0 This reasoning led the Second
Circuit to conclude that a strong federal need for a uniform standard under which foreign states might be sued in United States
courts cannot "implicate" a federal "cause" that would confer jurisdiction.8 ' Second, the court stated that the structure of article
III mandated the result. The court posited that if article III, section 2, clause 1 was not interpreted to mean "arising under a substantive law," then the other eight instances enumerated in that
article that confer federal jurisdiction would be surplusage.8 2 The
77. Id. Judge Kaufman drew an analogy between the instant case and Skelly
Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 339 U.S. 667 (1950), in which a federal statute,
the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1980), had to be interpreted to
vindicate a state-created right. See Verlinden II, 647 F.2d at 327. The Second
Circuit reasoned that the Declaratory Judgment Act and the FSIA both regulate
practice and, therefore, a suit cannot be brought for a violation of either. Id.
78. Verlinden II, 647 F.2d at 326.
79. Id. at 329. According to the court, the protection of rights created by
federal law was only a secondary goal of the Framers. Id.
80. Id. The court based this conclusion on THE FEDERALIST, No. 80, at 495
(A. Hamilton) (Putnam ed. 1888), in which the need for uniformity was described as extending only to causes, not to all federal laws. Verlinden II, 647
F.2d at 329.
81. The court's reasoning was based upon notions of federalism and comity
among the states. To drive home its point, the court quoted Alexander Hamilton: "Thirteen independent courts of final jurisdiction over the same causes,
arising upon the same laws, is a hydra in government, from which nothing but
contradiction and confusion can proceed." Verlinden II, 647 F.2d at 329 (quoting THE FEDERALIST, supra note 80, at 495).
82. Verlinden II, 647 F.2d at 329. For the language of article m, see supra
note 59. The court proffered an excellent example to support its analysis stating:
[I]f we decided that Verlinden's suit was one "arising under a law of the
United States" because it was brought under § 1330, then we could simi-

Fall 19831

THE VERLINDEN DECISION

Second Circuit held that because the FSIA merely regulates practice and does not confer substantive rights the FSIA does not
confer original subject matter jurisdiction when a suit is brought
s3
by an alien against a foreign state in federal district court.
C.

Verlinden III"The Supreme Court's Expansion of the FSIA

Chief Justice Burger wrote for a unanimous Supreme Court
which rendered a surprising reversal.8 s The Court, in a terse opinion, focused exclusively on the constitutional dimension of the
case and held that the FSIA's jurisdictional grant was within the
limits of article III. According to the Court, every action against a
foreign sovereign necessarily requires the application of a body of
substantive federal law and therefore arises under federal law,
within the meaning of article 111.85 In reaching this result, the
Court focused primarily upon the FSIA's language and Congress'
power to confer jurisdiction.
In short, the Court's decision rested upon the premise that because Congress exercises considerable authority over foreign commerce and foreign relations, it must have "the undisputed power
to decide, as a matter of federal law, whether and under what

larly hold that a suit "arose under a law of the United States" because it
was brought under § 1332. The constitutional diversity grant would then
be surplusage. If we are not to read the other phrases out of the clause, we
must restrict the first phrase to cases arising under a substantive law.
Id.
83. Id.
84. Indeed, law review articles seemed to be in accord with the lower courts'
interpretation of the FSIA, viewing a Supreme Court reversal as unlikely. See,
e.g., Recent Decision, Sovereign Immunity-Failure to Assert Affirmative Defense of Sovereign Immunity on Motion to Dismiss Does Not Waive Immunity
by Implication Under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 15 VAND.
J. TRANSNAT'L L. 629, 650 (1982).
85. Verlinden III, 103 S. Ct. at 1971. Indeed, the tenor of the Court's opinion was lackluster. At one point the Court seemed to rely upon the broad statement of Congress' powers in Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9
Wheat.) 738 (1824). The Court in Osborn posited: "[I]t be a sufficient foundation for jurisdiction, that the title or right set up by the party, may be defeated
by one construction of the constitution or law of the United States, and sustained by the opposite construction." Osborn, id. at 822. The Verlinden III
opinion later retreated slightly from this position, indicating that the Osborn
holding may have been narrowed. See Verlinden III, 103 S. Ct. at 1971. The
Supreme Court went on to state simply that Verlinden necessarily raised issues
of substantive federal law because the case concerned a foreign sovereign. Id.
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circumstances foreign nations should be amenable to suit in the
United States." 8 The Court concluded that Congress enacted the
FSIA to promote harmonious foreign relations and to foster foreign commerce.8 7 Consequently, an interpretation of the FSIA
was necessary in every action brought against a foreign state. 8
Specifically, the Court reasoned that to determine whether subject matter jurisdiction exists pursuant to the FSIA, a tribunal
first must decide if one of the exceptions to sovereign immunity is
applicable to the transaction in controversy. 89 The exceptions of
the FSIA govern the types of actions for which foreign sovereigns
may be held liable in a United States court. To that extent, "an
action against a foreign sovereign arises under federal law, for
purposes of Article III jurisdiction." ' 90
The Court buttressed its conclusion by stating that the application of the standards contained in the FSIA requires the interpretation of numerous points of federal law91 and that even when
none of the FSIA's exceptions apply to a given case, such a case
still would arise under federal law because the "construction" and
interpretation of the FSIA would bar the plaintiff from bringing
2
suit.9

86. Verlinden III, 103 S. Ct. at 1971. The reasoning was that suits against
foreign sovereigns raised sensitive issues concerning United States foreign relations. Id.
87. Id. Specifically, the Court stated: "In enacting the legislation, Congress
relied specifically on its powers to prescribe the jurisdiction of the Federal

courts, Art. I, § 8, cl. 9; to define offenses against the 'Law of Nations,' Art. I, §
8, cl. 10; to regulate commerce with foreign nations, Art. I, § 8, cl. 3; and to make
all laws necessary and proper to execute the Government's powers, Art. I, § 8, cl.
18." Id. at 1971 n.19.
88. Id. at 1971.
89. Id.
90. Id. The Supreme Court rejected explicitly the Second Circuit's analogy
between the "arising under" language contained in article III and the identical
language contained in the federal question grant of jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1331
(1976). See Verlinden III, 103 S. Ct. at 1971-73.
91. Id. at 1973.

92. To reach this conclusion the Court relied upon Osborn v. Bank of the
United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824), which the Court had cited with

reticence earlier in its opinion. The Supreme Court's ruling that the jurisdictional grant contained in the FSIA is consistent with the Constitution does not
signal the end of the Verlinden litigation. The Supreme Court remanded the
case to the Second Circuit to determine if statutory subject matter jurisdiction
exists under one of the FSIA's exceptions to sovereign immunity. The Southern
District held previously that the FSIA's commercial activity exceptions were in-
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III.

THE FOUNDATION FOR THE DECISION

A. Foreign Sovereign Immunity
Sovereign immunity is a principle of judicial restraint that bars
consideration of a claim brought against a sovereign,93 its agencies, or its instrumentalities. The doctrine is grounded in the notion that the exercise of jurisdiction by one nation over another
conflicts with the concept of sovereign equality among nations. 4
Foreign sovereignty is not part of the Constitution; rather, it results from the respect the United States gives to the sovereignty
of other nations. 5 Two theories address the scope of immunity
granted to sovereign nations. The restrictive theory immunizes a
foreign state from suits stemming from its public acts, but this

immunity does not extend to suits concerning a government's private or commercial acts." The absolute theory of sovereign im-

munity entitles foreign sovereigns to complete freedom from de97
fending a suit in another nation.
The United States adhered to the absolute theory of sovereign
immunity for well over a century. The judicial bedrock of that
9 8 In that deposition was The Schooner Exchange v. M'Faddon.
cision Chief Justice Marshall emphasized that nations are not ac-

applicable to Central Bank. See supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text. The
Second Circuit, however, has yet to consider whether jurisdiction exists under
the FSIA's exceptions. If the Second Circuit concurs with the Southern District,
the dispute will be over. Conversely, if the Second Circuit finds that jurisdiction
exists under the FSIA, then Verlinden will be remanded to the Southern District and tried on its merits. See Verlinden III, 103 S. Ct. at 1974.
93.

See

RESTATEMENT (SECOND)

OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED

STATES § 41(e) (1965).

94. See, e.g., Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30, 34-36 (1945).
95. See id.
96. H.R. REP. No. 1487, supra note 49, at 7, reprinted at 6605.
97. See H. STEINER & D. VAGTS, TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROBLEMS 645-46 (2d
ed. 1976).
98. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812). Chief Justice Marshall stated: "This full
and absolute territorial jurisdiction being alike the attribute of every sovereign,
and being incapable of conferring extra-territorial power, would not seem to contemplate foreign sovereigns nor their sovereign rights as its objects." Id. at 137.
The Schooner Exch. involved a libel action. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged
that their ship, the Schooner Exchange, was taken forcibly while afloat on the
high seas upon the direct orders of Napoleon. When the Schooner Exchange
landed in the port of Philadelphia, the plaintiffs sought to attach the vessel so
that she could be restored to them. Id.
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countable to one another. 9 Over one hundred years later in Berizzi Brothers Co. v. Steamship Pesaro,100 the Supreme Court
continued to follow the teachings of The Schooner Exchange v.
M'Faddon and adhered to the absolute theory of sovereign immunity. 101 At the time of the decision, sovereign states had begun "to
assume economic functions outside of the traditional framework
of administration and management," and several nations adopted
the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity. 02 During this period, initial decisions concerning the propriety of exercising jurisdiction over a foreign national in the United States federal courts
were made normally by the executive branch, and the judiciary
consistently deferred to these decisions."03 In accordance with the
prevailing absolute theory of sovereign immunity, the State Department "ordinarily requested immunity in all actions against
10 4
friendly foreign sovereigns.'

Because of mounting international pressure and the realization
that increased governmental involvement in commercial activities
spawns litigation typical of usual business transactions, the
United States judiciary began moving toward the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity. Two decisions, Ex parte Peru0 5 and
Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman, 08° illustrate this point. In Ex
parte Peru,'0 7 the Supreme Court held that a Peruvian owned

vessel was immune from a suit in which it was alleged that the
defendant failed to carry out a charter party. Although the Court
followed the State Department's recommendation that immunity
be granted, 08 it acknowledged implicitly that immunity may not
99. Id.
100. 271 U.S. 562 (1926).
101. Id. In Berizzi Brothers the Supreme Court was presented with a case of

first impression and conferred immunity upon a merchant ship owned and operated by a friendly foreign government. Id. at 576. According to Justice Van De-

vanter, no logical reason existed to distinguish between merchant ships and warships owned and operated by a foreign sovereign. Id. Another catalyst fostering
the movement toward the restrictive theory was "the spread of state trading
organizations." H. STEINER & D. VAGTS, supra note 97, at 645.
102. H. STEINER & D. VAGTS, supra note 97, at 645. These functions included
operating commercial vessels. Id.; see also supra note 100.
103. See Ex parte Peru, 318 U.S. 578, 587 (1943).
104. Verlinden III, 103 S. Ct. at 1968.
105. 318 U.S. 578 (1943).
106. 324 U.S. 30 (1945).
107. 318 U.S. at 580, 588-90.
108. Id. at 589.
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always be absolute. 10 9 In Hoffman the Court went further than Ex
parte Peru, and permitted jurisdiction over a Mexican owned
commercial vessel. 110 Taking advantage of the State Department's
reluctance to recognize the assertion of immunity by the Republic
of Mexico, the Court stated:
We can only conclude that it is the national policy not to extend
the immunity in the manner now suggested, and that it is the duty
of the courts, in a matter so intimately associated with our foreign
policy and which may profoundly affect it, not to enlarge an immunity to an extent which the government, although often asked, has
not seen fit to recognize.111
Then, in 1952, the State Department completed the evolution
by announcing its adoption of the restrictive theory of sovereign
immunity. 11 2 Even so, the dilemma of when to grant sovereign immunity continued. The State Department retained its role of initially suggesting whether immunity should be granted, and again,
the courts generally implemented those suggestions.1 1 3 A natural
byproduct of the new approach was the diplomatic pressure that
foreign nations seeking immunity directed toward the State Department.1 14 In addition, the State Department frequently abstained from making a determination, leaving the courts with dis-

109. See id. at 588. The Court stated that "courts may not so exercise their
jurisdiction by the seizure and detention of the property of a friendly sovereign,
so as to embarrass the executive arm of the government in conducting foreign
relations." Id.
110. 324 U.S. at 30. In actuality, the vessel belonged to the Mexican Government, but was in "the possession, operation, and control," id. at 32-33, of a private Mexican corporation. Id. The State Department took no official position
regarding Mexico's assertion of immunity. Id. at 31-32. The Court proffered that
where the State Department offered no official posture regarding immunity,

"courts may decide for themselves whether all the requisites of immunity exist."

Id. at 34-35.
111. Id. at 38.
112. See generally 26 DEPT. ST. BuLL. 984-85 (1952)(letter from Acting Legal

Advisor for the Secretary of State, Jack B. Tate, to Acting Attorney General,
Phillip B. Perlman (May 19, 1952)) [hereinafter cited as Tate Letter]. The Tate

Letter indicated the growing trend toward the restrictive theory, and then proceeded to outline the logic underpinning the State Department's decision to
abandon the tenets of absolute immunity espoused in The Schooner Exch. v.
M'Faddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812) and its progeny. See Tate Letter,
supra, at 984-85; see also supra text accompanying notes 95-111.
113. Verlinden III, 103 S. Ct. at 1968.
114. Id.
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cretion to decide if a sovereign should be immune from suit.115
Because of this bifurcated system, the executive department and
the judiciary considered widely differing criteria when deciding if
sovereign immunity should be granted. Thus, the rules governing
sovereign immunity were unclear and applied inconsistently. 116
Hoping to obviate these ad hoc determinations and their concomitant problems, Congress passed the FSIA in 1976. Although the
FSIA appears to offer extensive guidance for applying sovereign
immunity, in practice the FSIA has not proved very helpful to the
courts. In fact, the language of the Act has been described as "little more" than "the starting point for analysis of any procedural
question raised in an action against a foreign state." 127
B. The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
Section 1602 of the FSIA contains the framework for sovereign
immunity.118 Congress deemed the FSIA to be the sole guide and
standard for resolving questions of sovereign immunity.1' 9 The
FSIA protects foreign sovereigns and their alter egos. In other
words, a political subdivision, agency, or instrumentality of a foreign state is treated as a foreign sovereign.120 The FSIA, however,
115. Id.
116.

See Lowenfeld, Claims Against ForeignStates-A Proposalfor Reform

of United States Law, 44 N.Y.U. L. REv. 901, 906-09 (1969).
117. Gibbons v. Udaras na Gaeltachta, 549 F. Supp. 1094, 1106 (S.D.N.Y.
1982).
118. See FSIA, 28 U.S.C. § 1602. Section 1602 provides in relevant part:
"Under international law, states are not immune from the jurisdiction of foreign
courts insofar as their commercial activities are concerned, and their commercial
property may be levied upon for the satisfaction of judgments rendered against
them in connection with their commercial activities." Id.
119. H.R. REP. No. 1487, supra note 49, at 12, reprinted at 6610.
120. FSIA, 28 U.S.C. § 1603. Section 1603 provides in relevant part:
For purposes of this chapter (a) A "foreign state". . . includes a political subdivision of a foreign state
or an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state as defined in subsection
(b).
(b) An "agency or instrumentality of a foreign state" means any entity (1) which is a separate legal person, corporate or otherwise, and
(2) which is an organ of a foreign state or political subdivision thereof,
or a majority of whose shares or other ownership interest is owned by a
foreign state or political subdivision thereof, and
(3) which is neither a citizen of a State of the United States ... nor

created under the laws of any third country.
Id. The congressional report underlying the FSIA sheds further light upon the
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was not intended to change substantive liability.121
According to the restrictive theory of immunity as codified in
the FSIA, a foreign state may be subject to the jurisdiction of
United States courts only if one of the specific exceptions to immunity is met. 122 The exceptions contained in the FSIA permit
actions in which a foreign state waives its immunity,1

23

engages in

commercial activity "connected" with the United States which
gives rise to the cause of action, 24 or is subject to a counterclaim
types of entities the Act's drafters intended to be covered by § 1603's broad

brush: "[A]s a general matter, entities which meet the definition of an 'agency or
instrumentality of a foreign state' could assume a variety of forms, including a
state trading corporation. . . a central bank [or] export association ...
" H.R.
REP. No. 1487, supra note 49, at 15-16, reprinted at 6614.
121. H.R. REP. No. 1487, supra note 49, at 12, reprinted at 6610.
122. See FSIA, 28 U.S.C. § 1604.
123. Id. § 1605. Under the Act, a waiver may be effected implicitly or explicitly. Id. Although at least one court held that immunity from United States jurisdiction was waived implicitly through an agreement between contracting parties to subject themselves to a foreign nation's jurisdiction, see Ipitrade Int'l v.
Federal Republic of Nigeria, 465 F. Supp. 824 (D.D.C. 1978), the majority of
courts have been reluctant to find implicit waivers. See, e.g., Perez v. The Bahamas, 652 F.2d 186 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 865 (1981); Ohntrup v. Firearms Center Inc., 516 F. Supp. 1281 (E.D. Pa. 1981). For that reason it is easier
to arrive at a definition of an implicit waiver by focusing upon the courts' holdings as to what conduct does not constitute a waiver of jurisdiction. See Castro
v. Saudi Arabia, 510 F. Supp. 309, 312 (W.D. Tex. 1980) (agreement to indemnify United States does not result in a law of immunity); see also In re Rio
Grande Transp., Inc., 516 F. Supp. 1155, 1159 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) ("conditional
claim and answer" filed in response to a complaint, which by their terms were to
be effective only if sovereign immunity claims were denied, was not an implicit
waiver of immunity).
124. FSIA, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1605(a)(2), (3), 1605(b). The FSIA must be read in
conjunction with § 1603, the Act's definitional provision. Section 1603 defines
commercial activity as: "[E]ither a regular course of commercial conduct or a
particular commercial transaction or act. The commercial character of an activity shall be determined by reference to the nature of the course of conduct or
particular transaction or act, rather than by reference to its purpose." Id. §
1603(d). Section 1605 enunciates the Act's general commercial activity exception, denying immunity where:
[T]he action is based upon a commercial activity carried on in the United
States by the foreign state; or upon an act performed in the United States
in connection with a commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere; or
upon an act outside the territory of the United States in connection with a
commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere and that act causes a
direct effect in the United States.
Id. § 1605(a)(2). The drafters of the FSIA encouraged the courts to take an ac-
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that otherwise satisfies jurisdictional requirements. 125 Applying
the FSIA, however, is not as simple as matching exceptions to
causes of action. The structure of the FSIA intricately coordinates subject matter and personal jurisdiction, the requisites of
service of process, and the availability of sovereign immunity as a
12 6
defense.
Title 28, section 1330(a) of the United States Code governs
subject matter jurisdiction and confers upon the federal district
courts "original jurisdiction without regard to the amount in controversy of any nonjury civil action against a foreign state. . . as
to any claim for relief in personam with respect to which the foreign state is not entitled to immunity.' 27 Thus, under the FSIA,
the absence of sovereign immunity is a precondition to subject
matter jurisdiction. 128 Once subject matter jurisdiction is found 29
and service of process is made in accordance with detailed provisions of the Act, 130 personal jurisdiction exists automatically.
Stated simply, "subject matter jurisdiction plus service equals
personal jurisdiction, and personal jurisdiction coupled with
proper service defeats a claim of immunity."' A final aspect of
the FSIA warrants attention. The removal provision of the Act
allows a foreign sovereign named as a defendant in any civil ac-

tive role in establishing the parameters of the commercial activity exception. See
H.R. REP. No. 1487, supra note 49, at 16-17, reprinted at 6615-16. To a large
extent it is the judicial gloss upon that provision which gives the section its
judicial meaning. See, e.g., supra notes 42-53 and accompanying text. As a general rule, commercial activity is in the nature of conduct that is "customarily
carried on for profit." H.R. REP. No. 1487, supra note 49, at 16, reprinted at
6615.
125. FSIA, 28 U.S.C. § 1607.
126. Verlidor v. LIP/G/ Benghazi, 653 F.2d 812, 817 (3d Cir. 1981).
127. FSIA, 28 U.S.C. § 1330(a).
128. Maritime Int'l Nominees Establishment v. Republic of Guinea, 693 F.2d
1094, 1099 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
129. FSIA, 28 U.S.C. § 1330(b). Section 1330(b) provides in full: "Personal
jurisdiction over a foreign state shall exist as to every claim for relief over which
the district courts have jurisdiction under subsection (a) where service has been
made under § 1608 of this title." Id.
130. See id. § 1608.
131. Verlidor, 653 F.2d at 817. Indeed, § 1605 incorporates implicitly the

constitutional minimum contacts standard required for due process. See, e.g.,
Thos. P. Gonzalez Corp. v. Consejo Nacional de Produccion de Costa Rica, 614
F.2d 1247, 1255 (9th Cir. 1980); Waukesha Engine Div., Dresser Americas, Inc. v.
Banco Nacional de Fomento Cooperativo, 485 F. Supp. 490, 492 (E.D. Wis.

1980).
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tion initiated in a state court to remove the cause to a federal
forum."l 2 The FSIA recognizes that federal jurisdiction over foreign sovereigns is not exclusive. Yet, because of the removal provision, a foreign sovereign must acquiesce before it may be sued
in state court. 133
From this statutory framework, Congress hoped that a uniform
procedure for establishing the presence or absence of immunity
would evolve,134 thereby eliminating the inherent problems of the
State Department's ad hoc method used prior to the FSIA. "Practically speaking, [however,] the FSIA did little more than produce
a statutory skeleton from which the federal judiciary has been left
to create, through a case-by-case decisional process, a fully developed body of sovereign immunity law.' 13 5 The Supreme Court's
Verlinden holding is another step in that decisional process.
C. The "Arising Under" Language
The focal issue in both Verlinden IF'P and Verlinden IIP37 was
whether subject matter jurisdiction was lacking in the constitutional sense. This inquiry focused upon article

1113

of the Con-

stitution and, to a lesser extent, the grant of federal question jurisdiction contained in the United States Code.'
Because
Congress lacks the power to expand the federal courts' jurisdiction beyond the bounds of the Constitution, an examination of
article III is crucial to any investigation concerning the propriety
1 40
of a jurisdictional grant.
The seminal case construing article III's "arising under" lan132. FSIA, 28 U.S.C. § 1441. Section 1441 allows for removal "to the district

court of the United States for the district and division embracing the place
where" such action is pending. Id.
133. See id. For a discussion regarding application of § 1441 to the Verlinden analysis, see infra notes 217-27 and accompanying text.
134. See H.R. REP. No. 1487, supra note 49, at 7-8, reprinted at 6605.
135. Gibbons, 549 F. Supp. at 1106.
136. 647 F.2d 320 (2d Cir. 1981).
137. 103 S. Ct. 1962 (1983).
138. U.S. CONST., art. HI, § 2; see supra note 59 (text of art. M, § 2).
139. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1980). The language of § 1331 is virtually identical to
that contained in article III. Section 1331 provides that: "The district courts
shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions wherein the matter in contro-

versy exceeds the sum or value of $10,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and
arises under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States . .
140. Kline v. Burke Constr. Co., 260 U.S. 226, 234 (1922).

. ."

Id.
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guage is Osborn v. Bank of the United States. 4 ' That case reflects an expansive view of article III. The fundamental tenet of
Osborn, as stated by Chief Justice Marshall, is that "it be a sufficient foundation for jurisdiction, that the title or right set up by
the party, may be defeated by one construction of the constitution or law of the United States, and sustained by the opposite
1 42
construction.'
This broad view was refined in later decisions. In Shoshone
Mining Co. v. Rutter,143 the Court emphasized that "in a given
case" a suit to enforce a right of possession conferred by the laws
of the United States may not "arise under" the laws of the
United States.14 4 The Court in Shoshone recognized that "[a]
statute authorizing an action to establish a right" differs significantly from a statute "which creates a right to be established.' 4
Subsequent decisions clarified this view. In Puerto Rico v. Russell
& Co., 4" the Court reiterated that if the right asserted is
nonfederal "[flederal jurisdiction may [not] be invoked ...
141. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824). In Osborn, the Supreme Court refused to
strike down on article III grounds a statute granting the Bank of the United
States the capacity to sue in federal court on "state" causes of action. Speaking
for the Court, Chief Justice Marshall stated: "[T]he judicial department may
receive from the Legislature the power of construing every such law" constitutionally enacted by the legislature. Id. at 818.
142. Id. at 822. In Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 48182 (1957), the Supreme Court noted that the scope of the Osborn holding is
subject to question. If interpreted literally, Osborn could allow for original federal jurisdiction in the remote situation where a federal question might be
presented. See id.; see also P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D.

SHAPIRO & H. WECHSLER,
HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 866-68
(2d ed. 1973) [hereinafter cited as HART & WECHSLER].

143. 177 U.S. 505 (1900). In Shoshone, the Court refused to allow federal
jurisdiction to a claimant who sought to litigate a dispute concerning the possession of land held under a federal patent. The Court emphasized that although
some suits may arise under federal law, others may not contain any issue "under
the Constitution, or laws of the United States, but simply a determination of
local rules and customs, or state statutes, or even only a mere matter of fact."
Id. at 508.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 510.
146. 288 U.S. 476 (1933). In Russell, the Puerto Rican Government sued to
collect a tax. The defendant, Russell, petitioned for removal to a federal court.
Russell argued that federal jurisdiction existed under article III because Congress established both the Puerto Rican Government and the plaintiff's right to
sue. Id. at 482; see Guinea Brief, supra note 3, at 9 (presentation of the evaluation of the "arising under" clause and the role of Russell in that process).
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merely because the plaintiffs right to sue is derived from federal
law.

'147

Thus, under this reasoning it is the nature of the right,

not the source of the authority that establishes the right, determines when the federal courts have jurisdiction. Then, in Gully v.
First National Bank,"" the Court stated that the emergence of a
federal question in a suit does not prove the suit is grounded in
federal law.' 49 The Gully Court answered the question of whether
a suit arises under federal law by asking if construction of the
federal law would be outcome-determinative of the underlying
suit. 150 If the answer is positive, then the federal court has subject
matter jurisdiction over the case.' 51
A review of these decisions does little to establish the precise
boundaries of article III's "arising under" language. Indeed, the
federal courts rarely have construed the language of article III,
primarily because the passage in 1875 of the precursor to the federal question jurisdictional grant, 28 U.S.C. section 1331, obviated
the need for "direct resort" to the Constitution. 152 Significantly,
cases construing the statutory jurisdictional language, even
though that language is virtually identical to that contained in
article III, cannot be accepted as constitutional interpretations.
Jurisdiction pursuant to article III's "arising under" language is
broader than federal question jurisdiction pursuant to section
1331.13 Heavy reliance upon decisions construing the language of
147. Russell, 288 U.S. at 483.
148. 299 U.S. 109 (1936). In Gully, the plaintiff sued in a Mississippi state
court to recover a money judgment for back taxes against a national banking
association. Id. at 111. First National Bank sought to remove the cause to fed-

eral court alleging that the suit "arose under" the Constitution or laws of the
United States because the power to tax a national bank was created in a federal

statute. Id. at 112.
149. Id. at 115.
150. Id. at 114.
151. Id.
152. Verlinden II, 647 F.2d at 325.
153. Verlinden III, 103 S. Ct. at 1972. The Verlinden III Court made clear
that limitations imposed on jurisdiction under § 1331 are not limits on Congress'
constitutional power to give the federal courts jurisdiction. Id. (citing Romero v.
International Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 379 (1959)). The Court
went on to state emphatically that the Verlinden II court's "heavy reliance" on
federal question decisions was "misplaced." Verlinden III, 103 S. Ct. at 1972.
Jurisdictional scholars have argued that deciding whether identical language
also requires similar interpretation depends in part upon the context in which
the language is linked. See Shulman & Jaegerman, supra note 73, at 405 n.47.
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the general federal question statute, therefore, would be imprudent. Yet, because courts have construed the statute in numerous
decisions, those decisions at least offer valuable guidance to construction of that crucial constitutional language.""
Three distinct types of suit exist within the "arising under"
language of section 1331. The first category, suits arising under
the law creating the cause of action, was introduced by American
Well Works Co. v. Layne & Bowler Co.'5 5 In that case the Court
held that a cause of action for damages resulting from threat of
suit under a patent law did not constitute a suit arising under the
patent laws.156 The decision in Smith v. Kansas City Title &
Trust Co.15 7 initiated the second category of suits. In that case
the Court held that when a complaint requires the interpretation
of a federal law, the constitutional jurisdictional requirements are
met."5 ' Two recent cases, Ivy Broadcasting Co. v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co.'5 9 and Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co.,'6 0 refined the principles enunciated in Smith. The Ivy
Broadcastingcourt extended the Smith doctrine to include interpretations of federal common law, which confer substantive
rights.' Conversely, the Skelly Oil court narrowed Smith, holding that the interpretation of a federal statute that regulates procedure was inadequate to provide a constitutional basis for juris154. Verlinden II, 647 F.2d at 325.
155. 241 U.S. 257, 260 (1916). In American Well Works Co., plaintiff alleged
that defendants slandered his title to a water pump. Plaintiff argued that he was
entitled to damages because defendants' remarks, constituted a patent infringement. Id. at 258-59. In reaching its decision that the suit did not "arise" under
the patent law, the Court stated that "[w]hat makes the defendants' act a wrong

is its manifest tendency to injure the plaintiff's business, which is a cause of
action under the law of the state, not the infringement of a patent." Id. at 260.
156. Id.
157. 255 U.S. 180 (1921). In Smith, a shareholder sued to enjoin a corporation from purchasing allegedly illegal bonds in violation of its charter. State law

created the cause of action because the corporate charter was enacted pursuant
to state law. The plaintiff's grounds for suit, however, required the interpreta-

tion of federal law. The bonds were issued pursuant to a federal law that plaintiff believed was unconstitutional. Id. at 198-99.
158. Id. at 199.
159. 391 F.2d 486 (2d Cir. 1968).
160. 339 U.S. 667 (1950).
161.

Ivy Broadcasting,391 F.2d at 492-93. The Ivy Broadcasting court be-

lieved that "federal common law" regarding duties of communications carriers,

when read in light of the Communications Act of 1934, affects substantive

rights, thereby making subject matter jurisdiction available. Id. at 492-94.
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diction.16 2 Furthermore, both the courts and commentators agree
that a federal statute that provides for affirmative defenses cannot be used to invoke jurisdiction on the grounds that the statute
will be interpreted once the defense is raised.16 3 For example, Jus-

tice Cardozo, speaking forcefully for the Court in Gully v. First
NationalBank in Meridian,"" stated that "[a] suit does not arise
under a law renouncing a defense, though the result of the renunciation is an extension of the area of legislative power which will
cause the suitor to prevail." ' 5 The source of the third group of
suits within section 1331's "arising under" language is Clearfield
Trust Co. v. United States.166 In that case Justice Douglas stated
that "[iun absence of an applicable Act of Congress it is for the
federal courts to fashion the governing rule of law according to
their own standards. 1 67 The Clearfield decision is now recognized
as requiring the imposition of "federal common law" in those
cases in which a court finds a national interest so strong that a
judicially created federal rule of decision preempts the state law
that would otherwise govern the cause of action.168 Clearfield is
162. Skelly Oil, 399 U.S. at 673-74. The conflict in Skelly Oil arose when a
natural gas pipeline company sought a certificate required by federal law from
the Federal Power Commission for the construction and operation of a pipeline.
The pipeline company sought an interpretation of its contract pursuant to the
Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201. Skelly Oil, 399 U.S. at 669-70. Although the suit required an interpretation of the Act, jurisdiction was denied.
The Court stated that the right to be vindicated was "State created," and therefore, did not arise under federal law. Id. at 673.
163. See Gully v. First Nat'l Bank of Meridian, 299 U.S. 109 (1936); Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149 (1908).
164. 299 U.S. 109 (1936).
165. Id. at 116.
166. 318 U.S. 363 (1943). In Clearfield Trust, a private business had honored
a fraudulently endorsed check drawn on the Treasury of the United States. The
check was subsequently endorsed over to the plaintiff trust company. Shortly
thereafter, the intended beneficiary executed an affidavit alleging forgery. Id. at
364-65. The Court stated that the issuance of commercial paper by the United
States is extensive and affects many states. Id. at 367. To avoid an inevitable
diversity of results in suits involving such matters, the Court held that a "federal common law" should be developed to foster uniformity in the decisions. See
id. at 367. The Court noted that the Treasury's authority to issue the check was
vested in the Constitution and the federal laws and was not dependent upon any
state law. Id. at 366.
167. Id. at 367.
168. Verlinden II, 647 F.2d at 326. Frequently, the national interest is uniformity of decision. See In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 635 F.2d 987
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cited frequently and has received much comment in subsequent
decisions. For example, in United States v. Standard Oil Co.,""
the Supreme Court held that "federal common law" applied when
the United States sought recovery in tort for a soldier's medical
expenses resulting from the defendant's negligence.17 0 A determi-

native factor in the Court's decision to apply "federal common
law" was the absence of a state interest.17 ' This state interest con-

cept was determinative in Standard Oil and was expanded in
Wallis v. Pan American Petroleum Corp.7 2 The Wallis Court
stated that when deciding whether to apply "federal common
law" to a given suit, a court should determine if a federal policy
or interest conflicts with state law, and also examine the strength
of the state interest and the feasibility of creating a judicial substitute.17 3 Subsequent decisions applied and refined the Wallis
criteria. By holding that "federal common law" was inapplicable
to an alleged breach of contract by the Federal Aviation Administration, the Supreme Court in Miree v. DeKalb County'7 4 narrowly construed Wallis.'7 5 Writing for the majority in Miree, Justice Rehnquist considered it dispositive that the petitioners did
not raise a question concerning the liability or obligations of the
(2d Cir. 1980).
169. 332 U.S. 301 (1947). In Standard Oil, a soldier was injured by defendant's truck and hospitalized. Upon payment of $300, the soldier released the
defendant from any claims arising out of the accident. The government sought
recovery of hospital expenses. Id. at 302.
170. Id. at 305.
171. Id. at 307.
172. 384 U.S. 63 (1966). Wallis presented the issue whether, in general, federal common law or state law should govern the dealings of private parties in an
oil and gas lease when it was executed pursuant to the Mineral Leasing Act of
1920. Id. at 68. In holding that federal common law should not govern such a
situation, the Court emphasized that no aspect of the federal statute was inconsistent with state law. Id. at 69-71.
173. Id. at 68.
174. 433 U.S. 25 (1977). Miree resulted from the crash of a Lear Jet shortly
after its takeoff. The petitioner sought to impose liability on the respondent as a
third party beneficiary of a contract between it and the Federal Aviation Administration. Id. at 26-27. The district court dismissed petitioner's claim, holding that DeKaib County was insulated from suit by governmental immunity. Id.
at 27. The court of appeals sitting en banc reversed, holding that principles of
"federal common law" should govern the case. Id. at 27-28. The Supreme Court
reversed that decision. Id. at 26.
175. 384 U.S. 63 (1966).
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United States.17 6 Justice Rehnquist emphasized that the litigation

was between private parties 177 and that its outcome had no direct
impact on the United States or the Treasury.17 8 In a more recent

decision, In re "Agent Orange" Product Liability Litigation (In
re "Agent Orange"),17 9 the court clarified Wallis by urging courts

to consider the presence of a substantial federal interest in the
outcome of the litigation, the effect on the federal interest should
state law be applied, and the effect on the state interest should
state law be displaced. 80° The court in In re Agent Orange concluded that when a suit involves private litigants, the federal goal
of uniformity of decision cannot be attained,'' and therefore, this
particular situation is inappropriate for the application of "fed82
eral common law.'1

176. Miree, 433 U.S. at 28-29.
177. Id. at 30-31. Chief Justice Burger, in a concurring opinion, stated that
he did not read Clearfield as "precluding the application of 'federal common
law' to all matters involving only the rights of private citizens." Id. at 34. Burger
went on to state that "[a]lthough federal courts will be called upon to invoke it
[federal common law] infrequently, there must be federal judicial competence to
declare the governing law in an area comprising issues substantially related to
an established program of government operation." Id. at 35.
178. Id. at 29.
179. 635 F.2d 987 (2d Cir. 1980). In In re "Agent Orange," a suit was
brought by veterans of the United States armed forces against companies that
supplied the United States with "Agent Orange" for use in the Vietnam War.
The veterans alleged that they incurred various physical injuries from exposure
to the defoliant. Id. at 988-89.
180. Id. The test was fashioned by the district court but applied by the Second Circuit. See id. at 990.
181. Id. at 993. The court in In re "Agent Orange" noted two concerns of the
government in establishing a uniform body of law. They were "uniformity for its
own sake" and uniformity in the content of the rules. Id. The court implied that
both concerns must be satisfied before federal common law may be imposed. See
id. The court considered the first concern to be inherently impossible to satisfy
in a suit between two private litigants because no substantial rights of the government would depend upon the outcome of the suit. Id. at 993-94.
182. Id. at 994. Even the prospect of uniform decision making was viewed as
an insufficient reason to invoke "federal common law." Id. at 993. Two reasons
were cited. First, it is the nature of the federal system that different states will
apply different laws to suit the perceived needs of their respective jurisdictions.
Id. at 994. Second, "where a federal statutory program governs the rights of
private litigants and Congress has left gaps to be filled by the courts, uniformity
is not prized for its own sake." Id.
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THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE DECISION

The Court's Role in Interpreting the FSIA

The Supreme Court's Verlinden holding is unique. The Court
necessarily had to choose a narrow or a broad interpretation of
the FSIA. A narrow interpretation logically required the Court to
declare the FSIA unconstitutional as applied to the Verlinden
facts. Interpreting the Act broadly, however, would result in a significant expansion of federal jurisdiction absent any indication
that Congress intended to expand jurisdiction. Because the Constitution does not permit Congress to expand the jurisdiction of
the federal courts beyond the bounds of article

111,183

jurisdic-

tional statutes should be interpreted narrowly absent a clearly expressed congressional intent to confer jurisdiction upon the federal courts."8 Contrary to this fundamental tenet of statutory
construction, the Supreme Court took an activist role in Verlin18 5
den and construed the statute in its most expansive terms.

That construction permits an alien to sue a foreign nation in
United States federal courts even though "Congress formed no
clear intent as to the citizenship of the plaintiffs under the
Act."186 Moreover, comparing the evolution and construction of
183. See, e.g., Hodgson v. Bowerbank, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 303 (1809).
184. See Shoshone Mining Co., 177 U.S. 505, 506. The Court stated in Shoshone that where an ambiguous statute is at issue "the question is not one of the
power of Congress, but of its intent." Id. at 506.
185. See FSIA, 28 U.S.C. § 1330(a). Section 1330(a) gives district courts original jurisdiction "of any non-jury civil action against a foreign state." Id. (emphasis added).
186. Verlinden II, 647 F.2d at 324. Two distinct lines of thought have developed concerning the Act's silence on the appropriateness of such suits. Arguably,
the plain language of FSIA § 1330(a) allows an alien to bring suit against a foreign state in a federal district court. Professor J. Moore adopted this view. See
id. (citing 1 J. MOORE, J. LuCAs, H. FINK, D. WECKSTEIN & J. WICKER, MOORE'S
FEDERAL PRACTICE 0.66[4], at 700.178-.179 (2d ed. 1983) [hereinafter cited as J.
MOORE]). Professor Moore sees a "plain intention. . . to confer on the district
court jurisdiction of an action by an alien against a foreign state if the action
otherwise meets the requirements" of the Act. Id. (quoting 1 J. MOORE 0.66[41,
at 700.178-.179). Professor Moore's conclusion is buttressed by the FSIA's removal provision-28 U.S.C. § 1441(d)(1976). Id. This new subsection allows a
foreign sovereign named as a defendant in "[a]ny civil action brought in a state
court" to remove to a federal forum. Id. Under this line of reasoning, if aliens
were barred from suing foreign states in federal courts, the stated purpose of the
removal provision, developing a uniform body of federal law governing assertions of sovereign immunity, H.R. REP. No. 1487, supra note 49, at 32, reprinted
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the FSIA's jurisdictional provision to its statutory counterparts
reveals no evidence that Congress "intended to create a completely new federal jurisdiction over otherwise non-federal claims
brought by foreign parties against foreign states.' 187 An examination of the history of the FSIA further illustrates this point.
Before enactment of the FSIA,citizens could sue foreign states
in federal court under either the federal question" or diversity

at 6631, would be thwarted. See Verlinden I, 488 F. Supp. at 1292; 1 J. MOORE,
supra, 1 0.66[4], at 700.179. Language throughout the Act's legislative history
can also be construed to indicate that the FSIA's silence regarding whether the
plaintiff must be a United States citizen was intentional. H.R. REP. No. 1487,
supra note 49, provides that the FSIA determines "when and how parties," id.
at 6, reprinted at 6604, can maintain a suit against a foreign state and that the
Act applies to "any claim," id. at 13, reprinted at 6611, against a foreign state.
See Verlinden II, 647 F.2d at 324. Furthermore, testimony presented at subcommittee hearings described the Act in the same broad terms. See id. at 323-24
(quoting Hearings on H.R. 11315: Before the Subcomm. on Administrative Law
and Governmental Relations of the House Comm. on the Judiciary,94th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1976) [hereinafter cited as 1976 Hearings]).The FSIA was described as
providing relief for private parties with claims, 1976 Hearings,supra, at 31 (testimony of Bruno A. Ristau, Chief, Foreign Litigation Section, Civil Division,
Dep't of Justice), and "private litigants," id. at 58 (testimony of Peter D.
Trooboff, Chairman of the Committee on Transnational Judicial Procedure, International Law Section, American Bar Association).
An equally persuasive argument can be made that the FSIA was designed to
ensure that United States citizens have access to federal courts when involved in
suits against foreign nations. Verlinden II, 647 F.2d at 323. The draftsmen of §
1330(a) believed that because of the ever increasing contact "American citizens"
have with foreign states, "U.S. businessmen" and "American property owner[s]"
must have a means to resolve "ordinary legal disputes" against nations. Id. at
323 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 1487, supra note 49, at 6-7, reprinted at 6605). President Ford, when signing the Bill into law, reiterated this view stating: "[t]his
legislation will enable American citizens . . .to ascertain when a foreign state

can be sued in our courts." Statement by the President on Signing H.R. 11315
Into Law, 12 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1554 (1976). Finally, testimony at the
hearings concerning the introduction of a statutory forerunner to the FSIA, referred extensively to "our citizens" in discussing the impact of the bill. Hearings
on H.R. 3493 Before the Subcomm. on Claims and Governmental Relations of
the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 18 (1973), cited in
Verlinden II, 647 F.2d at 323-24. In general, Congress emphasized that the Act
was limited, stating that it did not intend "to open up our courts to all comers
to litigate any dispute which any private party may have with a foreign state
anywhere in the world." Id. (quoting 1976 Hearings, supra, at 31).
187. Guinea Brief, supra note 3, at 6.
188. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1970).
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statute.189 Also, a technical reading of the pre-FSIA federal question statute permits suits between two foreign parties because the
statute's jurisdictional grant "depended upon the nature of the
claim rather than the parties' citizenship."190
Enactment of the FSIA changed the previous grants of diversity and federal question jurisdiction. Congress promulgated the
FSIA's new jurisdictional provisions, 28 U.S.C. sections 1330 and
1332(a)(4), to provide specifically for actions against foreign
states and continued jurisdiction over suits "between a foreign
state as plaintiff and United States citizens or states." '' Simultaneously, Congress deleted references to foreign parties in the diversity statute. 192 The statutory federal question grant, which was
silent regarding citizenship, remained unchanged.' 93 From this
historical framework it may be inferred that the FSIA's jurisdictional provisions do not provide for a new class of plaintiffs, but
clarify proper application of the FSIA's new sovereign immunity
rules. 94
The Court also assumed an activist role when it found the
FSIA to be a substantive provision. 95 That finding strengthened
the Court's conclusion that the Constitution did not preclude a
federal court from hearing Verlinden. In support of this conclusion, the Court noted that Congress enacted the FSIA pursuant
to its power to regulate foreign commerce and thereby established
"comprehensive rules governing sovereign immunity."'196 According to the Court, the rules of the FSIA and their interpretations
governed the types of actions in which jurisdiction over a foreign
sovereign could be exercised. 19 7 Thus, the exercise of jurisdiction
in Verlinden comported with article III's requirements because
the FSIA necessitated interpretation by the Court. 98 By deeming
the FSIA to be substantive, the Supreme Court deviated significantly from its earlier holdings that the underlying nonfederal
dispute established the nature of a case, even if a federal statute
189. See id. § 1332.
190. Guinea Brief, supra note 3, at 5.
191. See id.

192. Compare 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1970) with 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1976).
193. Compare 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1970) with 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1976).
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.

See Guinea Brief, supra note 3, at 6.
Verlinden III, 103 S. Ct. at 1973.
Id. (citing H.R. REP. No. 1487, supra note 49, at 12, reprinted at 6610).
Id.
See supra notes 84-90 and accompanying text.
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authorized the suit and prescribed the procedure for asserting a
claim. 199 The exceptions to the FSIA concern the circumstances
under which a claim is actionable, not the kind of claims that
may be brought or the procedure for bringing the suit. For example, the FSIA permits a contract action pursuant to its newly created commercial activity exceptions;200 it does not create a new
cause of action in "commercial activity." Thus, the FSIA does not
actually govern the types of claims that are actionable, as the Supreme Court stated. Finally, when compared with similar statutes, on balance the FSIA appears to be primarily a jurisdictional
statute. For example, 28 U.S.C. section 1350 permits an alien to
bring suit in tort, but the district courts have jurisdiction only if
the tort was "committed in violation of the law of nations or a
treaty of the United States."201 Although both section 1330(a)
and section 1350 of the FSIA confer jurisdiction, section 1350, unlike section 1330(a), provides the federal courts with substantive
"sources of decision"-the law of nations or a treaty of the
United States. 2 The FSIA contains no parallel provision. Moreover, its drafters did not envision it to affect substantive
20 3

liability.

Despite the apparent inattention of the FSIA's drafters to the
199. See Puerto Rico v. Russell & Co., 288 U.S. 476 (1933); Shoshone Mining
Co. v. Rutter, 177 U.S. 505 (1900).

200. Arguably, a case between foreign litigants brought under the FSIA
could be said to arise under federal law in the sense that the cause of action was
created by the FSIA. That is, because no cause of action against a sovereign
could be maintained by a private litigant at common law, see The Schooner

Exch. v. M'Faddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch), 116 (1812), the FSIA can be said to
provide "a judicially enforceable right against the foreign sovereign in place of
the discretionary Executive remedy that had previously existed." See Brief for

Petitioner, supra note 9, at 37. A modicum of support for this position may be
garnered from the recent Supreme Court decision of Dames & Moore v. Regan,

453 U.S. 654 (1981). In that case the Court noted that traditionally the President of the United States settled citizens' claims against foreign sovereigns and
implied that because of the FSIA's enactment, an individual might have a claim

that this action by a President is a forced settlement and therefore a taking. Id.
at 689; see Brief for Petitioner, supra note 9, at 37.
201. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 9, at 37.
202. 28 U.S.C. § 1350. Section 1350 provides in full: "The district courts
shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only,

committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States."
Id.
203. See Jafari v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 539 F. Supp. 209, 214 (N.D. Ill.
1982).
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possibility of a suit with only foreign litigants and the potential
ramifications of expanding section 1330, the Supreme Court interpreted the statute to establish a new type of jurisdiction in federal courts. 0 4 The effect is to broaden the class of plaintiffs that
may sue a foreign sovereign in the United States and, to that extent, restrict a foreign state's immunity from suit in United
States courts. In Verlinden III the Court did more than fill gaps
in the language of the FSIA. The Court legislated a new jurisdictional grant, cloaked rhetorically as an inference of congressional
intent, from the plain meaning of the statute's provisions. To that
extent, the Court usurped Congress' role in derogation of the
principle of the separation of powers.2 °5
B.

The Constitutional Impact

In Verlinden III the Supreme Court recognized 20 6 that the
scope of the "arising under" language2 07 in article III of the Constitution is significantly broader than the identical language
found in the statutory federal question grant of jurisdiction.0 8

The breadth of the Court's interpretation is astounding. The
Court strongly implies that the "well-pleaded complaint" rule, a
pillar of United States civil practice established in Nashville &
Louisville Railroad Co. v. Mottley, 2°9 need not be followed at all

204. See supra text accompanying notes 118-21.
205. The Court believed that the Act's legislative history, see supra note 186,
revealed an intent not to limit jurisdiction under the FSIA. Verlinden III, 103 S.
Ct. at 1969. No other jurisdiction expressed agreement with the view of the Supreme Court. See Verlinden II, 647 F.2d at 323-24; Verlinden I, 488 F. Supp. at
1289; Jafari, 539 F. Supp. at 213.
206. See Verlinden III, 103 S. Ct. at 1969. The Court rejected the Second
Circuit's analogy between 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and article III of the Constitution,
stating:
Section 1331, the general federal question statute, although broadly
phrased, "has been continuously construed and limited in the light of the
history that produced it, the demands of reason and coherence, and the
dictates of sound judicial policy which have emerged from the [statute's]
function as a provision in the mosaic of federal judiciary legislation. It is a
statute, not a Constitution, we are expounding."
Verlinden III, 103 S. Ct. at 1972 (quoting Romero v. International Terminal
Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 379 (1959) (emphasis deleted)).
207. U.S. CONST., art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
208. 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
209. See Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149 (1908).
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times. 210 According to the rule, a defense that must be raised affirmatively cannot confer federal jurisdiction, no matter how urgent its federal nature or how likely it is that the allegation would
raise a constitutional question. Sovereign immunity is an affirmative defense pursuant to the FSIA.2 11 Until Verlinden III, a defense could not be "transformed into" part of the claim simply
because a federal statute requires the plaintiff to plead the defense as a ground for jurisdiction. In fact, the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure provide that a jurisdictional statement in a claim
is separate and apart from a claim.212 The Supreme Court sidestepped this dilemma by distinguishing Verlinden III from Mottley on the grounds that in the latter case the Court interpreted
the "arising under" terminology of the statute, not the
Constitution.2 1 3
If the Court continues to espouse this broad view of the "arising under" language in the Constitution, the result could be to
remove all bounds set by article III on Congress' ability to confer
jurisdiction.21 4 Pursuant to the Court's view in Verlinden III, virtually any jurisdictional statute could be deemed substantive if it
promotes federal interests 215 and contains some standards for allowing jurisdiction. 1 6 Consequently, the other jurisdictional
grants in article III may become surplusage.
C.

Concerns Regarding Federalism

The Supreme Court's apparent "end-run" around the "wellpleaded complaint" rule of Mottley raises the possibility that the
federal judiciary may intrude into the domain of the state judiciary. The "well-pleaded complaint" rule stems from the notion
that federal defenses are only hypothetical until they are
joined.21 7 Generally, the federal elements of a case are not appar8
ent until the case has been through the state court system.21
That appellate federal review is available does not indicate that

210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.

See Verlinden III, 103 S. Ct. at 1971-73.
Verlinden II, 647 F.2d at 326-27.
FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a).
See Verlinden III, 103 S. Ct. at 1972.
Jafari,539 F. Supp. at 214.
See Verlinden III, 103 S. Ct. at 1973.
See id.
See Guinea Brief, supra note 3, at 19.
See id. at 20.
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the federal courts have original jurisdiction over the matter.219
Article III's mandate that the federal courts exercise jurisdiction
only over genuine cases or controversies still must be satisfied.220
Just as the independent state ground doctrine precludes federal
courts from exercising jurisdiction over issues better left to the
state courts, 22' so should the "well-pleaded complaint" rule preclude federal jurisdiction over issues better left to the state judiciary. For example, if a defendant waives the defense of sovereign
immunity or concludes that a defense does not exist,2 22 the court

would decide a case in which the dispositive issues were grounded
exclusively in state or common law.223 Clearly, absent diversity jurisdiction, this situation trangresses the rule of constitutional federalism which does not permit federal courts to exercise jurisdiction over nonfederal claims.224
Moreover, nonfederal claims by aliens against foreign sovereigns can be adjudicated fully in the state courts. By its terms the
FSIA regulates state judicial proceedings in which foreign sovereigns are defendants.225 The Act's requirement for personal and
subject matter jurisdiction protects the foreign state and hence,
United States foreign relations. 226 Thus, "[f]ederal jurisdiction,
per se, adds nothing" in nonfederal claims.227

219. Id.
220.

U.S. CONST., art. III,

§ 2.

221. See, e.g., Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562
(1977). This doctrine prevents the courts from giving advisory opinions on federal issues ancillary to the judgment. Id. at 566. Thus, the rule ensures that
federal courts merely correct state judgments when they interpret federal law
inaccurately. See Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117, 125-26 (1945). Thus, if an adequate and "independent state ground exists, review of the federal question
would be advisory unless review is also had of the state ground." Guinea Brief,
supra note 3, at 21. Review of the state ground, however, would impair federalism and transgress the teachings of Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64
(1938). See Guinea Brief, supra note 3, at 21.
222. See supra notes 118-21 and accompanying text.
223. Guinea Brief, supra note 3, at 21-22.
224. Id. at 22.
225. See FSIA, 28 U.S.C. § 1441(d); see also supra notes 127-33 and accompanying text.
226. See supra notes 117-20, 122-26 and accompanying text.
227. Guinea Brief, supra note 3, at 16.
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D. The Problem of Waiver Under the FSIA
Waiver of immunity by defendants can cause problems in the
judicial system. Although the Supreme Court avoided expressly
the issue of whether a foreign state could waive its immunity
under the FSIA228 and thereby consent to a suit stemming from
activities "wholly unrelated" to the United States, 22 9 this result is
inevitable under the Court's reasoning. Also, at least one court
has held that a contract which provided for the application of law
from a particular nation to disputes between the parties constituted a waiver of sovereign immunity in the United States.23 0 The

Court's determination that Congress intended the FSIA to allow
the entire United States to be a forum 23 1 coupled with the oppor-

tunity for a nation to waive sovereign immunity, lends itself to
international forum shopping. Other problems are also likely to
arise. First, the traditional grounds for determining the proper forum are robbed of their logical significance. Second, ensuring a
fair trial between two foreign entities would be difficult and complicated considering the problems of access to sources of proof,
availability of compulsory process to compel the attendance of
unwilling witnesses, cost of attaining willing witnesses, possibility
of viewing the situs of the controversy, and the other practical
problems that such logistics present. Also, due process would be
especially difficult to implement when the results of litigation
could easily depend upon which party had the deepest pockets.
E. Providing Adequate Protection for United States Foreign
Relations
A chief concern of the Supreme Court in its Verlinden III holding was the need for the continued existence of cohesive foreign
relations between the United States and foreign nations. 232 To a
large extent the Court used this concern as a basis for its holding
that the FSIA was a substantive statute.233 Although the Supreme
Court rightly took this concern into account, the Act of State
228. FSIA, 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(1).

229. Verlinden III, 103 S. Ct. at 1970 n.15.
230. See Ipitrade Int'l v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 465 F. Supp. 824

(D.D.C. 1978).
231. See Verlinden III, 103 S. Ct. at 1969; see also Bankers Trust Co. v.
Worldwide Transp. Servs., 537 F. Supp. 1101, 1108 (E.D. Ark. 1982).
232. See Verlinden III, 103 S. Ct. at 1971.
233. See id.
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Doctrine, to some extent, accomodates the concern. The Act of
State Doctrine requires United States courts to refrain from adjudicating a politically sensitive dispute that requires a court to determine the legality of a sovereign act by a foreign state.234 The
doctrine resembles the political question doctrine in domestic
law,2" 5 and is grounded in the notion that "[t]o participate adeptly in the global community, the United States must speak with
'236
one voice and pursue a careful and deliberate foreign policy.

Anytime courts must consider the legality of a foreign nation's
acts, possible application of the Act of State Doctrine must be
addressed.2 87 Because of the protections offered by the Act of
State Doctrine, the Court in its reasoning of the Verlinden case
may have overemphasized the importance of federal regulation of
jurisdiction under the FSIA.
F. Practical Significance
Verlinden III, despite its shortcomings, is not devoid of merit.
First, the Supreme Court chose to address the constitutional issue. At least one court, commenting upon the Second Circuit's
holding, implied that the constitutional problem could have been
avoided if the Second Circuit had followed the well established
principal favoring a statutory construction over constitutional in-

terpretation. 2 s Fortunately, the Court chose not to sidestep the

234. International Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. OPEC, 649
F.2d 1354, 1358 (9th Cir. 1981).
235. Id. The Act of State Doctrine has a constitutional foundation. Banco
Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 423 (1964). It arises from the role
of the United States courts in our tripartite governmental system. International
Ass'n of Machinists, 649 F.2d at 1359. "It recognizes not only the sovereignty of
foreign states, but also the spheres of power of the co-equal branches of our
government." Id. In making a determination concerning the propriety of declining jurisdiction under the Act of State Doctrine, a court must consider the foreign government's motivations. See Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am., 549
F.2d 597, 607 (9th Cir. 1976). Such a consideration is irrelevant in sovereign
immunity determinations under the FSIA. The "crucial element" for declining
jurisdiction under the Act of State Doctrine is the potential for disrupting harmonious relations between sovereigns. Id.
236. InternationalAss'n of Machinists, 649 F.2d at 1359.
237. Indeed, while a court may exercise jurisdiction under the FSIA based on
a commercial activity exception, the Act of State Doctrine is not necessarily triggered. See id. When the United States foreign relations are impaired because of
commercial activity, the Act of State Doctrine becomes relevant.
238. Jafari v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 539 F. Supp. 209, 213 (N.D. IlM. 1982).
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constitutional ramifications of Verlinden and offered an affirmative interpretation of the FSIA, upon which lower courts may
rely.
Second, the Supreme Court's decision ensures that foreign nationals are precluded from asserting that the United States violated its treaties of establishment by declining jurisdiction of a
suit brought by an alien against a foreign sovereign. The United
States has executed this type of treaty with the majority of its
most important trading partners. 23 9 According to those treaties,

the United States must provide foreign enterprises and nationals
with the same access to its courts as United States companies and

nationals. 2 10 Thus, the treaties may require the courts to construe

the jurisdictional provision of the FSIA as permitting a suit by a
foreign national or company where a United States national or

company could sue. 24 1 This construction comports with the Su-

preme Court's broad interpretation of the FSIA242 and previous
Supreme Court decisions stipulating that treaties can be modified
only if Congress manifests clearly the intent that they be
modified.243
Third, the thrust behind the Verlinden III decision may have
been the Court's desire to guarantee that overseas United States
concerns be provided with federal protection. If Congress intended the FSIA to protect United States enterprises,4 then an
overly narrow reading of the FSIA would obfuscate that goal. A
substantial portion of the United States overseas commercial acThat principle, however, should be followed only when an alternative reading of
the statute is "fairly possible." Id.
239. See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 9, at 13.
240. See id. (citing Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation, Mar.
27, 1956, United States-Netherlands, 8 U.S.T. 2043, 2048, T.I.A.S. No. 3942).

241. Id. at 14.
242. See supra sections IIC and IVA.
243. See Cook v. United States, 288 U.S. 102, 120 (1933); Brief for Petitioner, supra note 9, at 14. A cogent argument may be made indicating that
treaties establishing friendship, commerce, and navigation would be unaffected
if the Supreme Court decided differently. These treaties do not refer specifically
to jurisdiction in the United States federal courts. See Guinea Brief, supra note
3, at 16. Accordingly, "[t]hey merely prohibit discrimination in access to United
States courts, state or federal against the citizens of a contracting sovereign." Id.
at 16-17. Thus, an alien plaintiff would be on no different footing than a United
States citizen who asserts a "non-federal claim against a non-diverse defend-

ant." Id. at 17.
244. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 9, at 13.
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tivity, "including business with foreign sovereigns, is carried on
through subsidiaries organized abroad.

'245

Because foreign sub-

26
sidiaries are "citizens" of the nation where they were organized,
suits that are substantively between United States businesses and
foreign sovereigns could not have been brought pursuant to the
FSIA 247 if the Court had construed the Act narrowly and held
that in all circumstances an alien could not sue a foreign national
in federal court.

G.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court's holding properly permits foreign subsidiaries to enjoy the benefits of federal law pursuant to the FSIA.
The breadth of the Verlinden III holding, however, is excessive.
In Verlinden II the Second Circuit's decision did not completely
prohibit aliens from suing a foreign sovereign in federal district
court. Instead, the Second Circuit held it inappropriate to assert
federal jurisdiction over the facts of Verlinden. The possibility
that the FSIA could be invoked to permit jurisdiction over a foreign sovereign in situations involving a litigant with a genuine
federal claim remained unanswered in Verlinden I. Indeed, after
Verlinden II the opportunity remained for the Supreme Court to
carve out areas of "federal common law" appropriate for the assertion of federal jurisdiction in suits between two foreign litigants. These steps could be taken in accordance with well established principles governing jurisdiction conferred by the statutory
"arising under" language. This approach does not conflict with
the Supreme Court's holding that the constitutional "arising
under" language is broader than the identical statutory language;
rather, it complements that reasoning. Because the constitutional
language is broader, it must include at least the concepts embodied in the statutory language. When a federal claim does not ex245. Id. This concern cannot be taken lightly. As counsel for Verlinden

pointed out in its brief:
According to the Department of Commerce, more than 85% of U.S. foreign direct investment is made through foreign subsidiaries.. . . In 1977,
majority-owned nonbank foreign affiliates of U.S. companies had over $507

billion in sales and $335 billion in assets .... The figures for foreign companies in which there are substantial U.S. minority interests are much
larger.
Id. at 13 (citations omitted).
246. Id. (citing Steamship Co. v. Tugman, 106 U.S. 118 (1882)).

247. See id.
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ist, state courts governed by the immunity standards of the FSIA
could handle the case until the point at which a federal claim is
presented. Thus, because the Supreme Court refused to act
boldly and decide that the FSIA as applied to the Verlinden situation lacked a constitutional basis, the Court necessarily assumed
an activist role and in so doing expanded significantly the bounds
of federal jurisdiction.
Gerald J. Pels

